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ABSTRACT 
 
Conventional wisdom in the water and sanitation sector holds that it is difficult to 
make simultaneous headway towards both cost recovery and serving the poor.  The 
case of Durban, South Africa, is often held to be one of the few examples where 
significant progress towards both of these ends has been achieved.  This thesis asks, 
to what extent Durban has actually been able to recover costs and meet the needs of 
the poor and examines how gains in these areas, if any, have been achieved.   
 
This thesis indicates that eThekwini Water Services (EWS), the Durban water and 
sanitation service provider, has had mixed success in achieving cost recovery.  The 
agency’s Water Department has moved towards improved cost recovery since 
1994/95.  Cost recovery for water supply in Durban is on par with benchmarks set 
by top-tier African providers but still remains well below standards established by 
American private sector providers.  In the Wastewater Department, however, 
growing annual deficits have been recorded in every year from 1994/95 to 2002/03. 
 
This thesis shows that the technological and policy innovations implemented by EWS 
have increased water and sanitation coverage for the poor in Durban.  Durban’s free 
basic water policy, in which each household receives 6 kL of water free per month, 
has been in part responsible for these gains.  At the same time, while connectivity 
has increased, the rate of service disconnections has risen over the period 1994/95 
to 2002/03.  As well, tariffs have risen for levels of consumption above 6 kL per 
month.  Both of these factors negatively affect poor households, especially those that 
are large, and temper the gains otherwise made in connectivity. 
 
The dynamic relationship between EWS’ cost recovery strategies and efforts to serve 
the poor is central to understanding the Durban case.  The agency recognized from 
an early point that it was financially prudent not to charge for low volumes of water.  
This recognition, combined with a need to make cost recovery palatable to the public 
and elected representatives, made provision of the 6 kL lifeline volume an extremely 
attractive policy option for EWS.  However, the fact that EWS’ efforts to achieve cost 
recovery are so intimately connected with the agency’s strategies for serving the 
poor is the primary reason that the gains EWS has achieved are contested.  
Furthermore, the fact that the Durban model for achieving cost recovery and serving 
the poor is so dependent on local administrative capacity and efficiency limits its 
application more widely.  The case should be instructive, however, for advocates for 
the poor who wish to understand how the rhetoric and complex politics of cost 
recovery and serving the poor are becoming ever more entwined. 
 
Thesis Supervisor:  Jennifer Davis 
Title:  Assistant Professor of Development Planning 
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“Water, thou hast no taste, no color, no odor; canst 
not be defined, art relished while ever mysterious. 
Not necessary to life, but rather life itself, thou fillest 
us with a gratification that exceeds the delight of the 
senses.” 
 
Saint-Exupéry, Wind, Sand, and Stars (1939), 8, 
Trans. Lewis Galantiére 
 
 
 
 
“The human right to water entitles 
everyone to sufficient, safe, acceptable, 
physically accessible and affordable 
water for personal and domestic uses.” 
 
General Comment 15 (2002) 
United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
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1.1  Introduction 
 
Over the past several decades, the diverse constellation of actors working on water 
and sanitation issues in the developing world has increasingly been resolved into two 
groups.  The first of these groups advocates for cost recovery through user fees as a 
means to sustainable service delivery while the second emphasizes the need for 
universal water and sanitation service as an essential poverty alleviation strategy.  
This chapter presents the genesis of these two very different approaches to service 
delivery and examines the reasons for the growing divide between the two. The 
Chapter also serves as the departure point for an in-depth case study of Durban, 
South Africa.  The case study examines a radically different model for meeting the 
water and sanitation needs of the urban poor in a city that has attempted to chart a 
course beyond the cost recovery / serving the poor debate. 
 
Experience shows that urban water and sanitation service providers have tended to 
focus on the achievement of either financial self-sufficiency or equity goals in their 
overarching approach to service delivery.  Broadly speaking, since the development 
of modern urban water and sanitation delivery systems, providers have made the 
transition from an early focus on financial self-sufficiency towards increased attention 
to fulfilling equity goals through intensive state intervention and back again towards 
a focus on cost recovery.  There are two principal reasons for this largely 
dichotomous approach to service delivery.  The first is that the bulk of world 
experience indicates that it is difficult to make substantial progress towards 
achievement of both of these ends simultaneously.  It seems that service providers 
consider it better to focus on doing one of these things and doing it well.  The second 
reason for this bipolar approach to urban water and sanitation provision is the large, 
and growing, gulf between the different groups that support each of these aspects of 
service delivery.  Both cost recovery and serving the poor are promoted by 
increasingly vociferous and entrenched groups that see themselves as supporting 
opposing and mutually exclusive interests.    
 
In order to gain a clearer understanding of how cost recovery and meeting the needs 
of the poor are balanced in urban water and sanitation service delivery, it is critical 
to define these terms. The following sections present prevailing conceptions of cost 
recovery and pro-poor service delivery and review the theoretical bases upon which 
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advocates argue their importance to developing-country water and sanitation 
planning. 
 
 
1.2  Cost Recovery 
  
Since the late 1980s, the water and sanitation sector has seen a gradual shift 
towards greater emphasis on cost-recovery in both developed and developing 
countries.  This transition is part of a broader change in how the state’s role in 
providing services is conceived and reflects the strong influence of neo-liberal 
economic principles on public sector reform efforts of the past twenty years 
(Haughton, 2001).  Adding to the global push for cost recovery is an increasing 
recognition of the economic value of water and a realization that, with the withering 
of the welfare state, public funds to subsidize service will not be available indefinitely 
(Bond, 1999).   
 
In principle, the concepts underlying cost recovery are simple.  Cost recovery entails 
the recovery of all, or as much as possible, of the costs that are incurred by a service 
provider in providing a service (McDonald, 2002).  For practical purposes, these 
costs include three major components for the water and sanitation sector: 1) the 
cost of providing infrastructure, 2) the cost of connecting an individual household to 
the system, and 3) the cost of operating and maintaining the system (Komives and 
Prokopy, 2000).  While some providers collect fees to cover infrastructure, the 
greatest emphasis is placed on covering operation and maintenance costs.  There are 
also differences in what cost recovery entails for public and private actors in the 
water and sanitation sector.  Cost recovery for private sector providers generally 
entails a surplus above and beyond the cost of production to allow for profit.  For 
public sector providers, this may or may not be the case.  In both cases, however, 
the objective is the recovery of the full costs of production. 
 
Beyond recovering the straight-forward financial costs of operation, maintenance and 
capital expenditure, full cost recovery also implies recovery of the costs associated 
with the use and depletion of resources (Raftelis, 1989).  In the case of water and 
sanitation service provision, for example, there are often high environmental costs 
associated with wastewater disposal.  In the developing world it is not uncommon for 
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untreated wastewater to be discharged to lakes, rivers, and streams, with dramatic 
consequences for the quality of recipient waters.  There are also often environmental 
costs associated with the use of water resources to serve as sources of drinking 
water.  Withdrawal from surface bodies of water may place aquatic species at risk 
and damage habitat while withdrawal of water from aquifers may lead to salt-water 
intrusion or physical subsidence of the ground.  There are also costs associated with 
depletion of water resources.  These depletion costs reflect the fact that once a 
natural resource, such as water stored in a watershed, is tapped for use, it is no 
longer available for alternate uses and is no longer part of the hydrologic cycle of the 
catchment area.  To achieve truly full cost recovery, these environmental and 
depletion costs should also be reflected in prices charged to consumers (Harris and 
Tate, 2002).   
 
 
1.2.1  Implementing Cost Recovery 
 
While the principle underlying cost recovery might be relatively straightforward, its 
implementation is more challenging and complex.  For services that can be measured 
volumetrically, such as the provision of metered water, cost recovery will be best 
achieved by charging consumers the full short-run marginal cost of production plus a 
portion of long-term operating and maintenance costs (McDonald, 2002).  Although 
there are a number of ways of calculating these costs (Dinar, 2000), most models 
involve a downward sloping marginal cost curve where, as a result of economies of 
scale, high-volume consumers are charged less per unit of consumption than low-
volume consumers.   
 
It is critical to note, however, that many services, such as unmetered household 
water, cannot be measured volumetrically.  Here, cost-recovery models generally 
rely on the average fixed and variable costs of the service applied as either a flat-
rate charge or as a component of the general rates (McDonald, 2002).  In practice, 
long run average cost is also applied to the pricing of metered water provision.  
Since the engineering pricing techniques adopted by most service providers focus on 
historic sunk costs as opposed to the future capital costs which are needed to apply 
marginal cost pricing, long run average cost generally serves as the practical default 
(McNeill and Tate, 1990).  
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Whether based on volumetric or flat charges, cost recovery models for water and 
most other services rely on the concept of “ring-fencing”.  This concept involves the 
identification and isolation of all costs and revenues associated with a given service 
and the removal of subsidies to and from that sector.  Ring-fencing means that 
resources, both human and financial, are not shared between service sectors, unless 
they are paid for on a cost recovery basis to the sector that provided them 
(McDonald, 2002).  Ring-fencing ensures that providers know all of the fixed and 
variable costs associated with service delivery.  In theory, once these costs are 
known they can be isolated and charged to the consumer-base.  
 
In reality, however, the actual costs of service provision in the water and sanitation 
sector are rarely known.  Costs to providers are tremendously complex and change 
frequently due to the “lumpy” nature of infrastructure investment (McDonald, 2002).  
As well, there are often joint costs that are difficult to divide between sectors, and 
methods of accounting for externalities are rarely adequate (Renzetti, 2000).  At 
best, then, cost recovery models are approximations of real costs and, instead of full 
cost recovery, it is fuller cost recovery that most service providers seek to achieve.  
In practical terms, most providers attempt to achieve fuller cost recovery by 
charging prices that are as close as possible to marginal cost in the short term, and 
to average cost in the long term, with the eventual aim of achieving full cost 
recovery (McDonald, 2002). 
 
 
1.2.2  Benefits of Cost Recovery 
 
Knowing what cost recovery is in economic terms, though, is only part of the 
equation.  It is also important to understand exactly why it is considered to be so 
important.  The central argument for cost recovery is that, if consumers pay enough 
to cover the costs associated with a service, there will be an increase in the financial 
and social sustainability of service delivery.  Proponents of cost recovery maintain 
that water and sanitation service delivery is improved both quantitatively and 
qualitatively when service providers engage in efforts to recover costs (Kalbermatten 
and Listorti, 1984).  There is, however, considerable debate over the degree to which 
this is true in practice. 
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The most commonly cited arguments for cost recovery are fiscal.  According to the 
World Bank (1998), the most important reason for applying cost recovery is the need 
to “balance the books” as a “matter of good public fiscal practice”.   By applying cost 
recovery, governments can reduce tax burdens to better attract and retain human 
and financial capital and redirect limited government resources to funding other 
services, such as health and education.  The strength of competitive pressures 
means that cost recovery, as a mechanism for reducing cross subsidization from 
industry and high-income households, is an attractive option for many local 
governments and service providers (McDonald, 2002).  In an era of steadily declining 
central government transfers, municipal governments are under increasing pressure 
to reduce tax and tariff rates in order to attract firms and investment and compete 
for investment and increasingly mobile flows of private capital (Kerf and Smith, 
1996).  It is not surprising, then, that governments are increasingly pushing cost 
recovery as a way to secure the funds needed for infrastructure investment and 
expansion. 
 
Proponents of cost recovery also contend that it is a vital means for sustaining 
services on a long-term basis.  Without cost recovery, many developing countries will 
not have the funds to invest in future service and infrastructure needs or the capital 
necessary to finance upgrades or extensions in service (Komives and Prokopy, 
2000).  Since, in the developing world, investment in capital construction is often 
emphasized over operation and maintenance, cost recovery through user fees is 
seen as a means of securing funds for these vital, but under-funded, activities.  As 
well, cost recovery through user fees can provide the additional money needed to 
fund expansion of service to otherwise unprofitable areas, which tend to be poor. 
Because cost recovery provides a means for financing further improvements in 
service and expansion it is often considered a necessary step to ensure that poorer, 
marginal areas remain connected (Brook and Locussol, 2002).  In an era of 
considerable cut-backs in inter-governmental transfers to local governments, the 
need for cost recovery to secure the financial resources needed for system 
improvements is more vital than ever.    
 
Another important set of arguments for cost recovery take their root in political and 
civic considerations.  The line of reasoning underlying these arguments is that if 
people have a “right” to receive water service, then they also have a “responsibility” 
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to pay for it (McDonald, 2002).  Considerable work, on the part of international, 
national, and local agencies, has gone into promoting the notion of civic 
responsibility through educational programs and literature focused on encouraging 
citizens to pay bills for water and other services.  A related argument is found in the 
extensive “willingness to pay” literature.  The rationale of this work is that most 
people accept their duty to pay the full cost of service delivery as long as service is 
reliable, affordable, and of high quality.  This is especially true of poor households 
who, research shows, often pay considerably more per unit volume of water than 
well-off households in payments to private water providers or in investments of their 
own time in securing alternate sources of water (Whittington, Briscoe, and Mu, 
1990).  Additionally, willingness-to-pay research reveals that households who do not 
have access to municipal networks often pay more for water and sanitation service, 
for example to private vendors, than they would pay for the full cost of a connection 
to the municipal system (Bakker, 2002). 
 
There are also strong environmental arguments advanced to promote the cause of 
cost recovery.  Subsidization, it is argued, promotes wasteful consumption of 
environmentally sensitive resources.  This is of special concern in many developing 
nations, especially on the African continent, where urban water supply is severely 
limited due to innate environmental conditions.  Since the “correct” value is not 
reflected in the price, there is little financial incentive to limit consumption of water 
or other publicly provided services (Serageldin, 1994).  In short, subsidization 
engenders waste while cost recovery encourages conservation.  The World Bank, for 
one, argues that price signals should be sent through rising block tariffs in order to 
curb over-consumption by the rich (World Bank, 1994).  With downward sloping cost 
curves for many services, these rising block tariffs are considered essential if 
conservation is to be achieved through pricing signals.   
 
Building on the commonly cited environmental arguments for cost recovery, it is also 
often argued that it is only through paying the full cost of a service that a consumer 
can appreciate its full “value”.   Receiving a service for free, or having it heavily 
subsidized, distorts not only its exchange value but also its use value (McDonald, 
2002).  According to the World Bank (1999), only “a fee reflecting the costs will 
encourage users to correctly value the service they receive”.   Charging a fee will 
“help reverse the ‘entitlement mentality’ that has been the historical result of 
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subsidizing public services”.  And by extension, users who pay for a service tend to 
have a vested interest in seeing that the service is reliable and of reasonable quality.  
Users who pay for service generally take an ownership stake in that service and are 
more likely to make demands of their service provider, thus driving improvements in 
responsiveness and accountability that are often lacking in developing-country 
agencies.  Cost recovery is said to improve performance on the part of service 
providers by giving customers an interest in seeing service that meets their 
expectations.    
 
The final benefit attributed to cost recovery is that it promotes efficiency, 
accountability, and transparency by giving providers an easy indicator of 
performance – a surplus spells success, while a deficit spells failure.  By the same 
logic, subsidies, by ignoring the bottom line, are seen to contribute to governmental 
mismanagement and promote inefficiency.  The application of cost recovery in urban 
water and sanitation service provision is, therefore, fundamentally connected to the 
introduction of business principles into the sector.  The introduction of cost recovery 
is also a key component of a larger drive to commercialize public services, 
particularly in the developing world, by applying business concepts to public sector, 
ring-fenced agencies.  By forcing managers to think about the bottom line, it is 
thought that cost recovery engenders creativity, leads to transparency, and provides 
an incentive to improve service delivery (McDonald, 2002). 
 
 
1.3  Meeting the Needs of the Poor 
  
As is the case with the provision of any service with distinct public characteristics, 
there are substantial equity considerations associated with access to water and 
sanitation.  In the past, disparities in coverage between rich and poor were 
traditionally dealt with through subsidization of service to low-income households 
(Bond, 1999).  However, as the result of a global decline in the disbursement of 
public funds for subsidization of service delivery, there are growing concerns that the 
poor are facing inordinate increases in rates, declining levels of service, or loss of 
service altogether (McDonald, 2002).  This is especially true in the developing world, 
where the decline in public spending has been most abrupt.  In concert with this 
decline in the availability of public funds, concerns have increasingly arisen over the 
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degree to which the push for cost recovery has further compromised the poor’s 
access to water and sanitation and slowed expansion of service to the underserved.  
 
Advocates for serving the poor argue that there are strong health and economic 
arguments for ensuring that all urban residents receive water and sanitation 
services.  These individuals argue that there are strong economic multipliers 
associated with providing the poor with access to water and sanitation services 
(Bond, 1999).  Adequate water and sanitation services are seen as necessary 
preconditions for economic development.  Likewise, the strong positive and negative 
health–related externalities associated with water and sanitation are seen to militate 
for serving the poor.  If the poor are healthy, there are positive externalities that 
accrue to the rest of society.  If the poor are unhealthy, then there are strong 
negative externalities that can likewise have profound ramifications for the rest of 
the population.  For these reasons, many consider it prudent to ensure that the poor 
have access to some minimum level of water and sanitation services that can ensure 
basic levels of both health and productivity.  In fact, experience in the United States 
shows that, since the early 20th century, investments in water and sanitation services 
for densely populated, low-income communities are seen as a form of health 
insurance for wealthier neighboring communities. 
 
At the international level, the needs of the poor and the responsibilities of service 
providers are quite clear.  The World Health Organization, World Bank, and USAID, 
for instance, have all established clear benchmarks for the level of water and 
sanitation service that is required to meet basic needs (Gleick, 1996).  These 
standards all call for a basic allotment of 20-40 liters of water per person per day.   
These international standards seek to ensure that the poor, or other typically 
underserved populations, receive some basic level of coverage that meets daily 
requirements needed for health and subsistence. However, international standards, 
such as those laid out by the World Health Organization, are often beyond the 
capacity of many developing nations to meet in the short term.  Since the definition 
of “poor” and “underserved” varies considerably across countries and governments 
vary widely in their willingness and ability to address the challenge of serving these 
groups, the result has been a hodge-podge of national standards and policies that 
have left dramatic gaps in coverage, especially in the poorest of nations.    
 
 19
The statistics on access to water and sanitation in the developing world are 
undeniably grim -- 3.4 million people, mostly children, die annually from water-
related diseases, 2.4 billion people lack access to basic sanitation, and 1 billion 
people lack access to even improved water sources (United Nations, 2003).  Given 
the scope of the challenge faced in the rapidly growing cities of the developing world 
especially, a number of approaches have been developed at the international, 
national, and local levels to meet the water and sanitation needs of the poor.   
 
The traditional approach to addressing equity concerns that arise from the pricing of 
volumetrically-measured services has been to implement increasing block-tariffs that 
ensure that poor, low-volume consumers do not subsidize wealthier, higher-volume 
consumers.  These block tariffs make initial levels of consumption more affordable by 
charging higher than marginal cost prices at upper levels of consumption.  The 
increased revenues gained from high volume customers are then used to subsidize 
low volume, and hopefully, poor customers.  As mentioned, increasing block tariffs 
have two important progressive benefits: 1) they provide consumers with a level of 
subsidized consumption and 2) work to curb consumption by high-volume 
consumers.  In the case of services that cannot be measured volumetrically, equity 
concerns are often dealt with through the use of differential rates, determined 
according to household income through a means test or through some form of 
property valuation.  
 
There are several critical problems with the use of standard increasing block tariffs 
as a means of addressing equity concerns in water and sanitation delivery.  Typically, 
for example, the blocks that constitute the tariff schedule are poorly devised.  As a 
result, a very large number of households often fall in the first or second block of the 
tariff and thus end up receiving heavily subsidized water.  Since, with an increasing 
block tariff, consumers face a low volumetric per-unit price up to a specific quantity 
or block, households perceive additional water within a block to be cheap 
(Whittington, 2002).  Since block tariffs fail to reflect the real economic cost of water 
and water is often in limited supply, many households use all the water they can get 
from the distribution system.  Under water-scarce conditions, such behavior may 
lead to water shortages and households may turn to water storage tanks to take 
advantage of the ensuing lack of reliability.  Increasing block tariffs may also 
disadvantage the poor in circumstances where multiple households share a 
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connection.  When poor households share connections and water bills are calculated 
on the basis of a block tariff that was designed for single households, the bill will 
reflect a higher average cost of water.  As a result, poor households sharing a 
connection under increasing block tariff conditions typically pay higher average per-
unit costs than middle and upper income households (Whittington, 1999). 
   
Advocates of cost recovery have presented full cost recovery as an alternate means 
of addressing the challenge of serving the poor and underserved in the water and 
sanitation sector.  Rather than attempt to secure increasingly scarce funds to pursue 
the traditional path of subsidization, advocates of cost recovery propose that the 
poor’s lot can be best improved through application of the cost recovery model.  
Since research indicates that the poor actually pay more for water and sanitation 
than the rich in many cases, they too can benefit from introduction of a strict cost 
recovery model (Komives et. al., 2001).  By giving the poor an option other than 
private water vendors, service providers can save the poor valuable money that can 
then be applied to other household needs.  Advocates of cost recovery argue that the 
strong inverse relationship between income and the amount paid for water means 
that cost recovery is in itself an effective pro-poor policy. 
 
Cost recovery is, however, only one of a number of novel techniques and policies 
that have been advocated over the past several decades as a means of improving 
service to the poor.  Other common approaches to addressing the needs of the poor 
with regard to water and sanitation service include the development of flexible 
technical standards for service delivery in developing countries (World Bank, 2002).  
The rationale underlying this approach is based on the fact that standards for 
delivery adopted in the poorest nations are often perversely rooted in developed 
country experience and have little relevance to the unique conditions of developing 
world cities.  For this reason, advocates have lobbied to reduce standards and 
introduce semi-pressure water delivery systems, tanker trucks that fill local cisterns 
and household tanks, condominial sewers, and new varieties of modern but 
inexpensive latrines.  All of these approaches focus on lowering the cost of service to 
improve affordability.  By providing less expensive service options to the poor, it is 
hoped that they will be able to gain access to basic services on financial terms that 
are more suited to their incomes. 
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Increasingly, however, a more dramatic approach to meeting the water and 
sanitation needs of the poor has been broached.  The provision of free water is a 
policy option that is attracting a growing number of proponents (WHO, 2003).  Often 
the rationale underlying this approach to service delivery is rooted in a human rights 
framework (Gleick, 1999).   In the same way that other human rights, including the 
right to health, have been enshrined in a number of international conventions and 
declarations, advocates of the poor have increasingly called for a human right to 
water.   Indeed, some have said that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 
1948 (United Nations, 1948), which guarantees all people a right to a standard of 
living adequate for their health and well-being, has long provided the grounds for 
declaring access to water a human right.   
 
In the past several years, however, it has no longer been necessary to look to the 
1948 declaration to find a basis for a contemporary human right to water.  This is 
because provisions for a human right to water were given stronger support in 2000, 
when the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
adopted a General Comment on the right to health.  This General Comment 
interprets the right to health as an inclusive right that extends not only to timely and 
appropriate health care but also to those factors that determine good health (WHO, 
2003).  These factors include access to safe drinking-water and adequate sanitation.  
In 2002, the Committee further recognized that water itself was an independent 
right. Drawing on a range of international treaties and declarations, it stated: “the 
right to water clearly falls within the category of guarantees essential for securing an 
adequate standard of living, particularly since it is one of the most fundamental 
conditions for survival” (United Nations, 2002). 
 
Regardless of their available resources, all states have an immediate obligation to 
ensure that the minimum essential level of a right is realized. In the case of water, 
this minimal level includes ensuring people’s access to enough water to prevent 
dehydration and disease (WHO, 2003).  There is, however, no strict enforcement of 
this type of right.  Instead there is a recognition that the realization of human rights 
is dependent on local resources and is subject to the principle of progressive 
realization.  This principle mandates the realization of human rights within the 
constraints of available resources and creates a constant and continuing duty of 
states to move quickly and effectively towards the full realization of a right.  Steps 
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towards the full realization of rights must be deliberate, concrete, and targeted as 
clearly as possible towards meeting the human rights obligations of a government 
(WHO, 2002) and may include legislative, administrative, financial, educational, and 
social measures or the provision of remedies through the judicial system. 
 
A rights-based approach to meeting the needs of the poor has implications for a 
range of actors concerned directly or indirectly with water issues.  Governments, as 
primary duty-bearers, must take concrete steps to respect, protect, and fulfill the 
right to water, and ensure that anyone operating within their jurisdiction does the 
same (WHO, 2003).  Approaching development from a rights perspective is held to 
have the added benefit of informing people of their legal rights and entitlements, and 
empowering them to achieve those rights.  Rather than seeing people as passive 
recipients of aid, the rights-based approach puts the individual at the centre of 
development.  Furthermore, proponents contend that a rights-based approach will 
deliver more sustainable solutions because decisions are focused on what 
communities and individuals require, understand and can manage, rather than what 
external agencies deem is needed. 
   
 
1.4  Relationship Between Cost Recovery and Serving the Poor 
 
It has been proposed that the extensive “hollowing out of the state” that has 
transformed the water and sanitation sector over the past two decades, and the push 
for cost recovery that has followed in its wake, have forced service providers to 
sacrifice serving the poor in order to meet financial targets.  But is it true that cost 
recovery is incompatible with achieving equity goals in water and sanitation service 
delivery?  While not mutually exclusive, these two rationales certainly do not seem to 
be immediately compatible in their individual efforts to make water widely available 
(Jaglin, 2002).  The fact that the water and sanitation sector throughout the world, 
and in the developing world in particular, has undergone great shifts in approach 
from one to the other, as opposed to engaging in any melding of the two, would 
seem to lend credence to the belief that cost recovery and satisfying equity goals do 
not lend themselves to each other.  Critics of cost recovery and an increasing 
number of the developing-world poor themselves contend that cost recovery has not 
simply become a more important part of a balanced service delivery ethos, but has 
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rather become a fixation that has displaced prior models that emphasized 
subsidization.  This has led to a sharp decline in state intervention on behalf of the 
poor and ultimately failed to satisfy the water and sanitation needs of the urban 
poor. 
 
As we have seen, proponents of cost recovery have been quick to rebut the 
contention that there is a necessary tradeoff between cost recovery and serving the 
poor.  They claim that a shift towards cost recovery does not necessarily mean an 
abandonment of the pursuit of equity or of serving the poor.  Rather, they hold that 
the pursuit of cost recovery is, in itself, a pro-poor policy that serves to ensure 
greater levels of service to all consumers.  In some cases they also maintain that a 
focus on cost recovery does not necessarily spell a complete end to subsidization and 
that targeted assistance and rising block tariffs may be helpful, if not essential, for 
meeting equity targets.  As well, its advocates maintain that, in the face of the 
decline in public funds targeted directly towards the needs of the poor, cost recovery 
is an ever more powerful strategy for ensuring that the poor are guaranteed a 
minimum quality of service.  By paying the full cost of water supply, users ensure 
that the service they receive is reliable, sustainable, and meets their needs.  
Ultimately, this is often cheaper than the expensive private options that the poor 
usually turn to when unsustainable subsidized services fail.      
 
This complex dynamic between cost recovery and serving the poor is more than a 
theoretical disagreement, however.  The tension between the two has had a 
considerable impact on the global community’s ability to achieve water and 
sanitation goals at the international, national, and local levels.   Critically, both cost 
recovery and meeting the needs of the poor are clearly stated goals for many water 
and sanitation service providers.  Often, in an effort to satisfy advocates on both 
sides of the cost recovery/equity debate, strong legislation supporting both ends has 
been adopted with little consideration of how, in practice, they can be achieved side-
by-side.  As a result there has been considerable discussion in the literature and in 
policy circles regarding how to institutionalize and implement both cost recovery and 
equity goals in service delivery.  Given the conflicts that appear to be inherent 
between these two ends, the result has been considerable confusion on how to meet 
international and domestic targets for the sector.  
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Tension between cost recovery and serving the poor - or, perhaps more accurately, 
the groups that support these approaches - has hindered the fulfillment of past goals 
for the water and sanitation sector at the global level.  For instance, during the World 
Summit for Children in 1990, a commitment was made to secure universal access to 
safe drinking water by the year 2000 (UNICEF, 2002).  Failure to achieve this goal 
may, in part, be attributed to the fact that the bodies charged with coordinating cost 
recovery and the achievement of equity goals failed to communicate and cooperate 
effectively.  The World Bank, which sought to secure financing for projects which 
could help meet the goal, focused increasingly on cost recovery and privatization 
over this period.  The United Nations WHO and other humanitarian agencies, on the 
other hand, while working to ensure that the poor and underserved in particular 
gained access to basic services, focused on a more traditional approach centered on 
aid, education, and subsidization.  It seems undeniable that any success in bridging 
the divide between cost recovery and serving the poor will allow for great progress in 
fulfilling future targets in the water and sanitation sector.   
 
 
1.5  Local Management of a Global Tension: Cost Recovery and Social Equity 
in Urban Water and Sanitation Provision in Durban, South Africa 
 
This chapter has outlined the arguments for both cost recovery and serving the poor 
in urban water and sanitation service delivery.  In South Africa, as elsewhere, the 
tension between the two is highly evident.  However, the South African story, and 
that of the City of Durban in particular, departs from much of the body of 
international experience and is widely held to indicate that reconciliation between 
equity and cost-recovery objectives is possible.  In contrast to the prevailing wisdom 
of water and sanitation practitioners, the Durban case suggests that, under certain 
circumstances, it is possible to make substantial, simultaneous progress towards 
both fuller cost recovery and improving service to the poor.  Moreover, these gains 
have been made without privatization of the city’s water and sanitation utility, a 
strategy that many donor agencies advocate as essential to building the political will 
needed for establishing cost-recovering tariffs.  In the remaining chapters of this 
thesis, I investigate how eThekwini Water Services has seemingly moved towards 
achieving full cost recovery through user fees, while also extending services to low-
income households.  I also examine the arguments of those who contend that these 
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gains are not uncontested and have come at a price – particularly for the poorest of 
households in Durban.  Finally, I will discuss the extent to which the lessons of the 
Durban case can be extrapolated to other municipalities in the developing world. 
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“Hold a glass of pure water to the eye of the sun! 
…. This is the nearest analogy to the essence of 
human life 
Which is even more difficult to see. 
Dismiss anything that you can see more easily; 
It is not alive – it is not worth seeing.” 
 
Hugh MacDiarmid “The Glass of Pure Water” 1962 
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- CHAPTER TWO - 
 
Water and Sanitation Provision in Durban, South Africa:  
Site Setting and Methods 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the setting for the Durban water and sanitation case study and 
introduces the methods that will be employed to address the central question of the 
thesis.  The chapter begins with a presentation of the broad geographic, 
demographic, and political setting of Durban, a city that is widely held to be a role 
model in water and sanitation service delivery for its successes in achieving cost 
recovery and serving the poor.  The chapter then introduces the specific context for 
water and sanitation service delivery in South Africa, first at the national level and 
then for Durban specifically.  It then describes the Durban service area and 
summarizes extant conditions in the city regarding both water and sanitation 
coverage.  The chapter concludes with a presentation of the methods that will be 
employed to determine to what actual extent, and how, Durban is able to recover 
costs and meet the needs of the poor with respect to urban water and sanitation. 
 
2.2 Durban – Geographic, Demographic, and Political Setting 
 
The largest settlement in the province of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban is a major port city 
on South Africa’s eastern coast (30°20’00” S, 31°12’00” E) (Figure 2.1).  Durban is 
also the second-largest industrial hub in South Africa, after Johannesburg, and is one 
of the country’s fastest growing urban centers (Brocklehurst, 2001).  With a 
population of approximately 3 million people, Durban’s residents primarily live in 
free-standing low-cost housing units and, although the city has a number of upper-
class suburbs, at least 1 million inhabitants live in informal peri-urban settlements 
(Roberts and Diederichs, 2002).   
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Figure 2.1  Geographical location of Durban, with respect to Southern Africa [Source: 
www.mapquest.com] 
 
 
The transition from Apartheid rule to democracy in South Africa brought many 
changes in the way that the nation and its cities are run.  Primary among these were 
changes in the size and composition of the country’s largest metropolitan areas, 
including Durban.  In Durban, an initial expansion of the city took place in 1996 that 
increased the size of the city from a municipal area of 300 square kilometers to a 
transitional area of 1,366 square kilometers, creating an assemblage known as the 
Durban Metropolitan Area (DMA).  In 2000, the DMA was further enlarged to 
encompass a total area of 2,297 square kilometers (Roberts and Diederichs, 2002).  
These dramatic enlargements of the city are important since the inclusion of large 
areas of peri-urban, rural, and tribal lands within the city’s boundaries radically 
redefined both the identity of the city and the responsibilities of local government.  
As a result of these changes, the contemporary city of Durban – now referred to as 
the eThekwini Municipal Area (EMA) - has a full 60% of its territory composed of land 
that is peri-urban or rural in nature (Roberts and Diederichs, 2002). 
 
Prior to 1996, the racial structure of South African cities was enforced by local 
government systems that were expressly constituted on a racial basis.  White local 
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governments controlled the city center, commercial and industrial areas, and the 
White suburbs.  Subordinate bodies were established for Indian and Colored areas 
and nationally appointed boards administered the Black townships until the 1980s, 
when they were replaced by provincial authorities.  In Durban, the system was 
further complicated by the existence of privately held Indian and Colored land and 
the involvement of local tribal authorities in land management.  The result was a 
highly fractured and uncoordinated system of urban governance that resulted in 
gross inequities in the level of basic services delivered to citizens across jurisdictions.  
As an indication of the complexity of local government under Apartheid, before 
designation of the Durban Metropolitan Area in 1996, a combination of 52 individual 
authorities controlled different parts of Durban (Hindson and Ngqulunga, 2000). 
 
The political and economic landscape of Durban has changed dramatically over the 
past decade in response to the fall of the Apartheid system and the institution of 
democratic systems of national and local governance.  In 1989, under the leadership 
of President de Klerk, and through the continued activism of the African National 
Congress (ANC) and a host of other political groups, the Group Areas Act (1950) was 
repealed.  This Act had long been a cornerstone of the Apartheid regime’s policy of 
racial segregation and had served to control where people of different races could 
live and work.  In 1990, the ANC itself was unbanned and, in 1994, South Africa held 
the first democratic elections of the post-Apartheid era.   
 
In conjunction with the political changes that confronted Durban during the 1990s, 
the city also underwent an intense demographic change.  Since 1990, Durban has 
experienced a period of rapid urbanization and population growth that is largely a 
result of increased rural to urban migration (Kayaga and Franceys, 2001).  This 
migration can trace its origins to a number of distinct sources – including political 
violence, severe drought, and unemployment – that have all been exacerbated by 
the widespread socio-political changes that have swept the nation over the past 
decade. 
 
Despite the fact that Durban is a relatively wealthy city by African, and even South 
African, standards, poverty is still a serious problem.  The Durban Metropolitan 
Profile of November 1999 reported that 41 percent of the economically active 
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population of the DMA was not in formal employment and that 43 percent of 
households earned less than 1450 Rand1 per month (Durban Metro Unicity, 1999).   
 
As with many features of life in South Africa, incomes in Durban continue to reflect 
the biases of the Apartheid era.  Despite having a diverse population composed of 
four principal racial groups - Blacks (61%), Indians (24%), Whites (13%), and 
Coloreds (2.9%) – Whites continue to have the highest average incomes, with Blacks 
lagging well behind both Indians and Colored citizens (Hindson and Ngqulunga, 
2000).  The Report on Poverty, Inequality, and Human Development (2000), taking 
417.17 Rand per month as the benchmark of poverty, found that 67% of the Black 
population live in poverty, compared to 2% for Whites, 21% for Coloreds, and 21% 
for Indians.   
 
2.3 Water Delivery in South Africa 
 
With the election of the Government of National Unity in 1994, South Africa was 
faced with the enormous task of undoing decades of differential service provision 
across the races.  According to statistics from that year, 56.7% of the Black 
population in South Africa, totaling 17.3 million people, did not have access to 
adequate water supply (DWAF, 1994).  The situation for sanitation services was even 
worse in 1994, with 21 million people lacking access to adequate sanitation facilities 
(DWAF 1996). 
 
Urgent measures were clearly needed to address the water and sanitation crisis that 
faced the nation after the collapse of Apartheid.  Among the most radical approaches 
taken to address the problem was the drafting of a new Constitution and Bill of 
Rights that guaranteed all citizens the right to a safe environment and access to 
sufficient water and food (South Africa, 1996).   In order to realize the newly created 
rights that flowed from the new Constitution, a number of laws were drafted that 
have had a profound impact on water and sanitation service delivery.  The Water 
Services Act (1997), the National Water Act (1998), and the National Environmental 
Act (1998) have all served to reorient the delivery of water services in post-
                                                        
1 Prices in this thesis are reported in South African Rand.  The exchange rate as of 1 May 2003 
was 1 $US = 7.295 ZAR. (www.economist.com/markets/currency/) 
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Apartheid South Africa towards fulfilling the obligations laid out in the new South 
African Constitution (Stein and Niklaas, 2002). 
 
When the first government of post-Apartheid era came to power in 1994, a critical 
component of its agenda was the formulation and delivery of the national 
Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP).  This program aimed to improve 
the quality of life of all South Africans, particularly those that had been excluded 
during the years of Apartheid.  The RDP was intended to make real the promises 
outlined in the new South African Constitution, particularly with regard to basic 
services and infrastructure.  The government was keenly aware of the importance 
that water and sanitation services would have in building a strong nation.  In order 
to achieve their goals for the sector, a new Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 
(DWAF) was established in July 1994 to spearhead the efforts of the RDP.  The 
objectives of this new department with regard to water and sanitation services were 
spelled out in November of the same year in a seminal White Paper.  This paper 
clearly states that, “The goal of the new Department of Water Affairs and Forestry is 
to end the inequity in access to basic water supply and sanitation services” (DWAF, 
1994). 
 
The 1994 DWAF White Paper also outlines the financial approach that should be 
adopted by local authorities to ensure adequate water and sanitation service 
provision.  In outlining the nation’s cost recovery policy, the document states:  
 
“The basic policy of the Government is that services should be self-
financing at a local and regional level.  The only exception is that, 
where poor communities are not able to afford basic services, 
Government may subsidize the cost of construction of basic minimum 
services but not the operating, maintenance, or replacement costs.” 
(DWAF, 1994) 
 
For urban water services in particular, the 1994 White Paper clearly indicates that 
service providers should ensure all households receive a minimum level of basic 
service within a reasonable time frame  (Kagaya and Franceys, 2001).  Urban service 
providers are given responsibility for facilitating the provision of higher service levels 
through appropriate financing and tariff mechanisms, while also ensuring the 
financial viability of the water and sanitation sector at the municipal level.  To help in 
areas with limited potential for economic sustainability, the DWAF White Paper states 
the national government’s commitment to assisting cities through the fund of capital 
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costs for service extension (Kayaga and Franceys, 2001).  In effect, the White Paper 
lays out the two guiding considerations that are to guide water and sanitation service 
providers in the post-Apartheid era: cost recovery and serving the poor. 
 
The legal framework for implementing the 1994 DWAF White Paper is found in the 
Water Services Act of 1997.  This Act reiterates the right of every citizen to basic 
water supply and sanitation and outlines the responsibility of all water service 
institutions to take appropriate measures to effectuate these rights.  The Water 
Services Act dictates that, in setting water service tariffs, the responsible Minister 
may differentiate between users, different types and qualities of service, and by 
geographical area (DWAF, 1997).  Furthermore, it calls for the Minister, in 
prescribing the norms and standards for tariffs, to consider, among other factors, 
social equity, as well as the recovery of costs reasonably associated with providing 
the water services (Kayama and Fraceys, 2001). 
 
Section 4, subsection (3), part (c) of the Act gives the following conditions: 
 
“Procedures for the limitation or disconnection of water services must - 
…(c) not result in a person being denied access to basic water services 
for non-payment, where that person proves, to the satisfaction of the 
relevant water services authority, that he or she is unable to pay for 
basic services”.  (DWAF, 1997) 
 
Ultimately, the varied documents and legislation that have been produced by the 
South African government since the fall of Apartheid lay out two clear principles by 
which the sector is to be governed.  These two principles, of recovering costs and 
serving the poor, have been achieved with limited success by South  
African municipalities (Alence, 2002).  Perhaps none, however, is thought to have 
had as much success at achieving both as Durban.  It is clear that, if South African 
cities are to move towards fulfilling the broad commitments laid out for the sector at 
the national level, there will need to be deeper appreciation for how the most 
successful cities have worked to simultaneously achieve both of these ends.   
 
2.4 Water Delivery in Durban 
 
Water and sanitation service delivery in Durban is widely referenced in the literature 
as a sectoral success story and as a glimmer of light in the dark tunnel of public 
sector service provision in the developing world.  One of the most important reasons 
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for Durban’s widespread acclaim is that it is purported to have achieved something 
few other cities in the developing world, and the developed world, have managed – 
that is, to have simultaneously achieved cost recovery and met the needs of the 
poor.   
 
Water and sanitation services in Durban are provided by eThekwini Water Services 
(EWS).  EWS is the department of the eThekwini Municipality, as the city 
government is known, with responsibility for water supply, sanitation, and solid 
waste disposal.  The agency adopted its name in 2001 to reflect the new title given 
to the Durban Metro Unicity.  EWS replaces Durban Metro Water Services (DMWS), 
the name of the agency created by Act of Parliament in 1996 to provide water and 
wastewater services to the area under the jurisdiction of the Durban Metropolitan 
Council.    
 
Both Durban and EWS are unique in many respects.  For instance, Durban was the 
first urban jurisdiction in South Africa, and perhaps the world, to constructively 
recognize a human right to water.   As the first urban center to act on the human 
right to water enshrined in the South African Constitution and Bill of Rights, Durban 
has effectively served as a template for other municipalities in the nation.   
 
The means through which Durban has implemented the human right to water is 
particularly innovative, and has now been incorporated into national-level policy for 
the water and sanitation sector.  In 1998, Durban instituted a policy of providing all 
households with 6 kL of water free per month.  Provision of this “lifeline” volume of 
water to all households is the means through which the human right to basic water 
and hygiene is operationalized in Durban and is now the cornerstone of the national 
government’s policy for fulfilling basic water needs.   
 
Durban has also instituted a number of other frequently cited pro-poor services in 
the EWS service delivery area.  These include the development of a number of 
different supply service levels that allow more affordable water to be sent to low-
income households.  As a result, three different water service options are now 
available within the EWS service area: (1) a conventional full-pressure water 
delivery, (2) a semi-pressure systems that operate with roof tanks, and (3) a low-
pressure system that operate with ground tanks (Brocklehurst, 2001).  Both the 
semi- and low-pressure systems can be installed at lower cost than conventional 
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systems since they use small-diameter, low-pressure pipes.  The result of this 
innovative approach to service delivery is a system that responds effectively to 
consumer demand and maximizes the number of potential customers in the agency’s 
service area.  
 
A system of water bailiffs has also been introduced by EWS to operate standposts, 
from which they sell water to residents that do not have access to conventional 
systems, or either low-pressure option.  According to the World Bank, this ensures 
that everyone has access to water supply of some sort (Brocklehurst, 2001).  In 
some areas, automated standposts have also been established.  These allow 
residents to use pre-paid cards to access the water distribution system. 
 
EWS is also unique, not only for being at the forefront of efforts to meet the water 
and sanitation needs of the urban poor, but for its efforts to meet the second great 
demand placed on South African municipalities under the Water Services Act of 1997 
– cost recovery.  Durban was among the first South African municipalities to move 
towards full cost recovery through user fees for water and sanitation service 
provision.     
 
2.5  Definition of EWS Service Area and Customer Base 
 
The service area of EWS covers 100% of the eThekwini Municipality, an area known 
as the eThekwini Municipal Area (EMA).  The EMA represents a total area of 2,297 
square kilometers and is home to a population of approximately three million people 
(Roberts and Diederichs, 2002).   There are seven operational areas within the EMA: 
Metro, Central, Inner West, Outer West, North, South, and Umkomaas.  Figure 2.2 
shows these operational areas as well as several transitional districts which are being 
absorbed into the EMA. 
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Figure 2.2  Map of EWS operational divisions within the eThekwini Municipal Area (EMA) 
[Source: eThekwini Municipality (2002)] 
 
 
A selection of key geographic and service delivery parameters for the EMA is 
provided in Table 2.1.  These figures provide an indication of the total dimensions of 
the service area and the human and geographic scale over which EWS operates. 
 
 
Table 2.1  Geographic dimensions and service delivery parameters of the EMA  
Parameter Value 
Total Population of Service Area 3,000,000 + 
Total Number of Households in Service Area 674,419 * 
Total Area (km2) 2,297 + 
Percent of Population in Formal Areas (%) 75 
Percent of Population in Informal Areas (%) 25 
Total Area – Urban (km2) / (%) 934 / 41 ++ 
Total Area – Rural (km2) / (%) 1363 / 59 ++ 
+  (Roberts and Diederichs, 2002). 
*Assumes average household sizes of 4.5 in formal areas and 4.3 in informal areas (Durban 
Metro Unicity, 1999).   
++ Calculated using figures from eThekwini Municipality (2002) and Durban Metro Unicity 
(1999). 
 
 
As shown in Table 2.1, the major portion of the EMA actually consists of peri-urban 
and rural lands.  The total population of the 3,000,000 of the EMA corresponds to 
674,419 households, calculated using average household size figures reported by the 
Durban Metro Unicity (1999) 
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2.6  Current Water and Sanitation Coverage Levels 
 
An understanding of overall water and sanitation coverage in Durban is an essential 
precursor to pinpointing where gaps in service exist and identifying those populations 
that face a particular need for improved access to services.  The absolute number of 
connections and households served provides a comprehensive picture of the degree 
of connectivity that EWS has been able to achieve in the service area to date.  These 
values are reported in Table 2.2.   
 
 
Table 2.2  Water and sanitation connectivity in the EMA. 
Water 
Households with metered 
water connections 
352,000 
Household 
Connections Households lacking  
Metered water connections 
144,000+ 
Individuals 
Served 
Municipal Water Service 2,500,000 
Sanitation 
Households with  
waterborne sewerage 
326,000 
Household 
Connections Households lacking 
Waterborne sewerage 
212,000+ 
Total Sewerage 2,500,000 
Waterborne Sewerage 1,500,000 
Individuals 
Served 
VIPs and Septic Tanks 1,000,000 
+ (eThekwini Municipality, 2002) 
 
 
As indicated in Table 2.2, there is considerable variation in the levels of water and 
sanitation service provided to Durban’s residents.  These services range from fully 
metered household water connections and waterborne sewerage to water collection 
from natural water bodies and pit toilets.  As indicated in Table 2.2, municipally- 
provided water and sanitation services provide coverage for 2.5 million of Durban’s 3 
million residents. 
 
While the total number of household connections appears relatively low, at 352,000, 
it is important to note that this likely underestimates the number of households 
served (Macleod, 2003).  With formation of the EMA, large amounts of rural area 
were added to the municipality, and many rural-dwellers are known to source their 
own water from outside the city network through wells and boreholes (eThekwini, 
2002).  As well, many metered connections serve multiple households, as is the case 
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with the city’s rapidly increasingly number of condominiums.  After taking these 
factors into account, Durban’s most recent estimates of the number of underserved 
households – that is, those that lack piped water and waterborne sewerage - are 
144,000 for water and 212,000 for sewerage (eThekwini Municipality, 2002).    
 
Water and sanitation coverage rates, calculated as the population with individual or 
shared water and sewerage connections divided by the total population of the service 
area, are reported in Table 2.3.  These rates provide a comparative value against 
which historic levels of provision in Durban, and any future improvements, may be 
measured.  The values reveal that waterborne sanitation (that is a sewerage system 
that carries waste via a water-flushed network) has yet to reach many households 
that do have access to piped water connections.  As noted in Table 2.2, an estimated 
68,000 households that have access to piped water still lack access to waterborne 
sewerage (eThekwini Municipality, 2002).  
 
 
Table 2.3  Water and sanitation coverage rates for the EMA. 
Service Type Coverage Rates 
(% of Population with Service) 
Total municipal water coverage rate 83% 
Total sewerage coverage rate 83% 
Waterborne sewerage coverage rate 50% 
VIP and septic tank sewerage coverage rate 33% 
[Source: eThekwini Municipality, 2002] 
 
2.7 Methods 
 
The objective of this study is to begin to understand to what actual extent, and how, 
Durban is able to achieve cost recovery and meet the needs of the poor in the urban 
water and sanitation sector.  To meet this objective, an analysis of service delivery 
by EWS will be conducted with the aim of answering the following key questions: 
 
1.  To what extent are costs being recovered? 
2.  To what extent are the poor being served? 
 
To come to an understanding of how, or under what conditions, Durban is able to 
achieve the levels of cost recovery and service delivery to the poor that it does, I will 
triangulate between information gleaned from: 
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1. A comprehensive literature review 
2. An analysis of numeric data on the application of pro-poor and cost recovery 
strategies 
3. Interviews with key players in the Durban water and sanitation sector.   
 
2.8 Data collection techniques 
 
Data for a wide variety of variables with relevance to cost recovery and serving the 
poor were collected from EWS over the Spring of 2003.  Mr. Neil Macleod, Executive 
Director of EWS, kindly provided numeric data from the agency’s records.  These 
records relate to the agency’s expenses and revenues, to customer billing, and to the 
implementation of both pro-poor and cost recovery strategies.  This time-series data 
is compiled annually and covers the period from 1994/95 to 2002/03.  
 
Numeric data provided by EWS will be used to calculate and compile a series of 
standard indicators for both the achievement of cost recovery and service delivery to 
the poor.  The value of these indicators should provide a clear indication of the 
nature of service delivery in Durban in absolute terms and in comparison with 
benchmark values for the sector.  
 
Interviews and correspondence with key players in the Durban water and sanitation 
sector - from the water provider itself, from non-governmental organizations, and 
from universities -  were also undertaken in the spring of 2003. 
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“In time and with water, everything changes.” 
 
Leonardo da Vinci 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents a summary of the financial performance of eThekwini Water 
Services (EWS) between 1994 and 2003, with a particular focus on the agency’s cost 
recovery efforts.  It presents the annual operating revenue and expense profiles for 
the Water and Wastewater Departments of EWS and provides a summary of annual 
capital expenditures in both departments.  The chapter also provides a detailed 
summary of financial and operational performance parameters for the Water 
Department.  This includes a review of average water tariffs and supply costs and a 
summary of key indicators of the department’s operational and financial 
performance. 
 
In order to effectively evaluate the impact of the cost recovery measures adopted in 
Durban, as much data as possible was collected over a time series that captures both 
pre- and post-reform periods2.  The overall duration of the time series over which 
most data presented here was gathered is 1994/95 to 2002/03, the full period of 
time that EWS has been in operation and the full duration for which South Africa has 
been a multi-party democracy3.   
 
It is clear from the data presented in this chapter that EWS has had mixed success in 
achieving cost recovery.  In the Water Department, annual operating expenses 
outstripped revenues in five of the eight years between 1994/95 and 2001/02.  In 
2002/03, however, this trend is predicted to reverse itself.  In 2002/03, for the first 
time in 4 years, it is predicted the Water Department will balance operating expenses 
and revenues.  This general trend towards cost recovery in the Water Department is 
a victory of sorts.  It means that Durban is making headway on the cost-recovery 
goals it has set for itself.  Comparatively, the Water Department of EWS performs 
slightly below benchmark values for cost recovery, as documented for top-tier 
African providers, but well behind standards established by privately-owned 
American utilities.   
                                                        
2 Data are presented in the form of the major variables used to understand cost recovery and 
financial performance in the water and sanitation sector.  Emphasis in the chapter is placed on 
visual displays of findings, with the bulk of numeric data located in Appendices II-XII. 
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In direct contrast to the situation predicted for the Water Department, the year 
2002/03 is not predicted to be a banner financial year for the Wastewater 
Department of EWS.  Instead, operating expenses will exceed revenues for the 
department by an even greater margin than in any of the previous eight years.  The 
Wastewater Department, unlike the Water Department, is not moving towards 
greater cost recovery, but instead has encountered increasingly large annual 
operating deficits in each year since 1994/95.  
 
 
3.2 EWS Operating Revenues and Expenses 
 
3.2.1   Water Department 
 
3.2.1.1 Water Department Revenue Profile 
 
The profile of annual operating revenues for the Water Department of EWS, which 
accounts for all sources of operating revenue to the department, indicates that 
operating revenues have risen significantly for the department over fiscal years 
1994/95 to 2002/034.  A graph summarizing the Water Department’s inflation-
adjusted revenue profile in South African Rand5,6 is shown in Figure 3.2. It is 
important to note that the 2002/03 revenues indicated in this profile are projected 
values. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
3 Unless otherwise cited, all data compiled in this chapter was provided in raw form by Mr. Neil 
Macleod, Executive Director of eThekwini Water Services, from current and historical agency 
records. 
4 Complete data describing this profile is located in Appendix III. 
5 Prices in this thesis are reported in South African Rand.  The exchange rate as of 1 May 2003 
was 1 $US = 7.295 ZAR. (www.economist.com/markets/currency/) 
6 All prices referenced in this chapter have been adjusted to 2003 values using an average 
inflation rate of 7.32% for the eight-year period between 1994 and 2002.  This value was 
calculated using annual figures compiled from the quarterly reports of the South African 
Reserve Bank, Department of Finance Budget Review (South Africa, 1994-2002).  For 
complete data on annual inflation values and for background on the calculation of the average 
rate used here, please refer to Appendix II.  
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Figure 3.1  Complete profile of annual operating revenues (Rand) for the Water Department 
of EWS for each year between 1994/95 and 2002/03. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 indicates that, although most revenue sources remained fairly constant 
over the period 1994/95 to 2002/03, revenues from “water sales general” more than 
doubled over this same period7.  “Water sales general” refers to all funds taken in 
through tariffs and charges to consumers.  The figure indicates that the Water 
Department has primarily boosted operating revenues by raising the amount taken in 
through water sales from consumers. 
 
One revenue source of critical interest, subsidies, began in 1994/95 and 1995/96 
with values of almost zero.  In subsequent years, there was a substantial increase, 
with values reaching their peak in 1996/97.  Since 1996/97, however, the amount of 
subsidies towards the operating revenues of the Water Department has decreased 
again.  This likely reflects the decline in central to local subsidies that has 
                                                        
7 Due to the accounting standards adopted by EWS, some financial flows reported as revenues 
are in fact negative in value.  Rebates for private leaks are negative since they are paid out by 
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characterized public finances in South Africa since the country’s macroeconomic 
reforms of the mid-1990s (McDonald, 2002).  Due to the imposition of GEAR – the 
Growth, Employment, and Redistribution Program – central to local transfers 
declined 85% in real terms between 1991 and 1997 and an additional 55% between 
1997 and 2000 (Financial and Fiscal Commission, 1997).   
 
 
3.2.1.2 Water Department Expense Profile 
 
The operating expense profile for the Water Department of EWS, which accounts for 
all of the operation and maintenance expenses of the department, also shows a 
strong upward trend over the period 1994/95 to 2002/03.  A graphical 
representation of the full expense profile appears in Figure 3.28.   
 
Figure 3.2  Complete expense profile (Rand) for the Water Department of EWS in each year 
between 1994/95 and 2002/03. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
EWS to consumers who identify leaks that have led to overcharging.  “Other income” also 
includes components that, in some years, may end up being charges to the agency.   
8 Complete data describing this profile are located in Appendix III. 
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On a scale similar to that observed for the department’s revenue profile, total 
expenses for the Water Department more than doubled over the period 1994/95 to 
2002/03.  “General expenses” contributes to the greatest proportion of this 
increase9.  This expense category incorporates over 115 subsidiary costs and 
includes such expenses as sundries, small tools, refuse removal, and contracts for 
the reading of meters10.  Relative to the category “General Expenses”, most other 
expenses incurred by the Water Department are relatively consistent for the period 
1994/95 to 2002/03.  The other expense categories that did show increases are 
repairs and maintenance, capital charges, and salaries, although the first of these 
falls off to zero in the last three years. 
 
A number of costs within the broad category “General Expenses” show particularly 
striking increases over the study period.  One of these is costs incurred annually by 
the agency for security.  These are shown in inflation-adjusted terms, to 2003 
values, in Figure 3.3. 
 
Over the period 1994/95 to 2002/03, security costs for the Water Department have 
risen substantially.  As Figure 3.3 indicates, costs for security have become higher in 
each year of the study period, with the highest values recorded in 2000/01.  These 
rising security costs are primarily associated with the hiring of private security firms 
to oversee the disconnection policy of EWS.  Due to growing anger directed at the 
agency, it has become increasingly necessary for EWS agents to be accompanied by 
armed guards or attack dogs when they carry out disconnection visits (McDonald, 
2003).   
 
 
                                                        
9 Figure 3.2 also shows that both “Charged outs” and “Less recoveries” register negative 
values in the expense profile.  “Charged outs” refers to the process of charging out the costs 
associated with various services and supplies to internal units of an agency.  Since these 
values are deducted from the sum of the full range of EWS’ expenses before calculating total 
expenses, they appear as a positive cash flow in the figure.  “Less recoveries” refers to those 
agency costs that have been recovered by EWS, and are therefore also recorded as positive 
cash flows. 
10 A complete breakdown of the expenses included under the heading “general expenses” is 
found in Appendix IV. 
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Figure 3.3  Annual inflation-adjusted (to 2003 values) security costs incurred by the Water 
Department of EWS, 1994/95 to 2000/01 
 
 
3.2.1.3  Water Department Income Statements, Annual Operating Deficits, and 
Working Ratios 
 
Total operating revenues and expenses and annual operating deficits for the Water 
Department of EWS, for each year between 1994/95 and 2002/03, are shown in 
Table 3.1.  The table also presents annual working ratios, calculated as total 
operating expenses divided by total operating revenues, for each of these years.  For 
a service provider that is covering costs, the working ratio should equal to, or less 
than, one.  A working ratio of one indicates that operating revenues and expenses 
are equal in a given year.     
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Table 3.1  Total annual operating revenues, operating expenses, operating deficits, and 
working ratios for the Water Department of EWS. 
Year Total Operating 
Revenues (Rand) 
Total Operating 
Expenses (Rand) 
Annual Operating 
Deficit (Rand) 
Working Ratio 
94/95 227,016,635 227,017,830 -1,195 1.00 
95/96 295,997,726 295,997,726 0 1.00 
96/97 483,356,700 500,752,682 -17,395,982 1.04 
97/98 560,319,364 572,415,786 -12,096,422 1.02 
98/99 661,621,373 661,621,374 -1 1.00 
99/00 732,807,257 745,433,511 -12,626,254 1.02 
00/01 744,059,335 834,818,929 -90,759,594 1.12 
01/02 871,092,891 951,939,198 -80,846,307 1.09 
02/03 1,040,811,220 1,040,811,220 0 1.00 
 
 
Since cost recovery in the water and sanitation sector is typically understood to refer 
to balancing operating expenses and revenues (as opposed to a more expansive 
definition that includes both operating expenses and capital investment as 
recoverable costs), it is essential to look at the balance of the two to understand the 
success of any cost recovery effort.  When one does, as in Table 3.1 for the Water 
Department of EWS, one sees that the department has been within 20 million Rand 
of effective cost recovery in every year but two, 2000/01 and 2001/02 being the 
notable exceptions.  
 
Annual changes in total operating revenues and expenses for the Water Department 
are examined in greater detail in Figure 3.4.  This figure also shows the value of 
annual operating deficits incurred by the Water Department of EWS between 
1994/95 and 2002/03.   
 
Figure 3.4 indicates that the trajectories of operating revenues and expenses for the 
Water Department of EWS remained quite similar over the years 1994/95 to 
1999/00.  Over the next two fiscal years, however, total operating revenues fell 
below expenses considerably.  That is, expenses grew more rapidly than revenues 
over this time period.  It is projected that this gap will be fully closed in 2002/03. 
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Figure 3.4  EWS Water Department total revenues, total expenses, and annual deficits, from 
1994/95 to 2002/03 (Rand). 
 
 
 
The working ratio is used as an indicator of cost recovery and is particularly useful in 
analyses of cost recovery efforts because it allows comparisons with benchmark 
values.  As shown in Table 3.1, working ratios for the Water Department of EWS rose 
substantially between 1999/00 and 2001/02, as operating revenues experienced 
their greatest decline relative to expenses.  While the predicted value for 2002/03 is 
exactly one, the last recorded working ratios, in 2000/01 and 2001/02, were among 
the highest in the history of the agency (Figure 3.5). 
 
-200,000,000
0
200,000,000
400,000,000
600,000,000
800,000,000
1,000,000,000
1,200,000,000
1994 /
1995
1995 /
1996
1996 /
1997
1997 /
1998
1998 /
1999
1999 /
2000
2000 /
2001
2001 /
2002
2002 /
2003
Year
R
an
d Total Water Revenues
Total Water Expenses
Deficit
 53
 
Figure 3.5  EWS Water Department annual working ratios, over years 1994/95 to 2002/03.  
Benchmark values for African and American service providers are indicated.   
 
 
Figure 3.5 shows annual working ratios for the Water Department and reports two 
benchmark values for working ratios from other water and sanitation service 
providers.  The two values reported are the weighted average working ratio for eight 
African service providers (0.93) and the weighted average working ratio for 89 
privately owned American service providers (0.68) (World Bank, 2000).  In the case 
of the African providers the subset of agencies is clearly in the top tier of water and 
sanitation utilities on the continent.  However, this only makes the comparison with 
Durban more fitting, since Durban is one of the wealthiest cities in Africa and aspires 
to provide levels of service of an international caliber. 
 
Comparison of the EWS Water Department working ratio with the Africa benchmark 
value reported by the World Bank shows that Durban has hovered just above the 
African average.  Comparison with the American value further emphasizes that, while 
the utility has moved to better balance operating expenses and revenues, it remains 
quite far from achieving American private sector standards of cost recovery.  Given 
that the benchmark values are less than one, it appears that, unlike EWS, at least 
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some of the providers on which these values are based have operating revenues that 
exceed expenses.  The balances, in these cases, can then be allocated to capital 
costs and investments.  This opens the possibility that these benchmark agencies, 
especially those from the United States, may have a more expansive definition of 
cost recovery that includes some or all of capital costs.    
 
 
3.2.2  Wastewater Department 
 
3.2.2.1 Wastewater Department Revenue Profile 
 
In contrast to the detailed breakdown available for the operating revenues of the 
EWS Water Department, only total operating revenues are available for the agency’s 
sanitation division11.  A graph of these inflation-adjusted revenues appears in Figure 
3.6. 
 
Figure 3.6  Total annual operating revenues, in Rand, of the EWS Wastewater Department, 
between 1994/95 and 2002/03. 
                                                        
11 Tabular data on the annual values for Wastewater Department revenues are located in 
Appendix V. 
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With the exception of 1997/98, the revenues received by the Wastewater 
Department remained relatively steady at forty to sixty million Rand and do not show 
the continuously upwards trend evidenced in the Water Department.  The year 
1997/98 stands out, however, since in that year revenue more than doubled.  
Unfortunately, the breakdown of revenue sources for the Wastewater Department is 
unavailable and it is simply known that the department experienced a considerable 
revenue peak in this year.   
 
 
3.2.2.2  Wastewater Department Expense Profile 
 
The complete breakdown of inflation-adjusted operating expenses incurred by the 
Wastewater Department, and their sources, for all years between 1994/95 and 
2002/03 is located in Figure 3.712.   
                                                        
12 Full data on the operating expenses of the Wastewater Department are provided in Appendix 
V.   
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Figure 3.7  Annual operating expense profiles, in Rand, for the EWS Wastewater Department, 
over the period 1994/95 to 2002/03. 
 
Again, unlike the situation observed for the Water Department, the profile of 
operating expenses for the Wastewater Department does not show a continuous 
upwards trend.  Instead, overall expenditures for operation and maintenance have 
fluctuated in the past nine years, with peaks in 1997/98 and again in 2001/02.  In 
the same manner observed for the Water Department, “less recoveries” and 
“charged outs” record negative values to reflect the fact that they represent costs 
either successfully recovered or charged internally to the agency. 
 
 
The great annual variation in operating expenses and revenues for the Wastewater 
Department make it difficult to get an intuitive sense of how the two are balanced 
and how the department has fared in terms of cost recovery.  What is clear from 
these figures is that the Wastewater Department lacks the consistency in finances 
that appear to characterize the Water Department.  To evaluate the department’s 
success in cost recovery, working ratios for each year are calculated in the following 
section.   
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3.2.2.3  Wastewater Department Income Statements, Annual Deficits, and Working 
Ratios 
 
Inflation-adjusted annual operating deficits for the Wastewater Department of EWS, 
between 1994/95 and 2002/03, as well as working ratios, calculated as total 
operating expenses divided by total operating revenues, are shown in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2  Annual total operating revenues and expenses, operating deficits, and working 
ratios for the Wastewater Department of EWS. 
Year Total Operating 
Revenues (Rand) 
Total Operating 
Expenses (Rand) 
Annual Operating 
Deficit (Rand) 
Working Ratio 
94/95 21,462,586 75,732,954 -54,270,368 3.53 
95/96 22,976,171 91,192,653 -68,216,482 3.97 
96/97 30,635,094 106,193,687 -75,558,593 3.47 
97/98 112,429,642 202,780,247 -90,350,605 1.80 
98/99 41,591,582 144,646,915 -103,055,333 3.48 
99/00 45,045,650 160,297,253 -115,251,603 3.56 
00/01 44,282,167 164,715,638 -120,433,471 3.72 
01/02 56,914,431 273,525,127 -216,610,696 4.81 
02/03 58,435,500 300,081,700 -241,646,200 5.14 
 
 
As Table 3.2 indicates, the Wastewater Department of EWS has experienced growing 
operating deficits in each of the past nine years.  Although the working ratios for the 
department have not declined in every year, the overall trend is decisively 
downwards over the period.  To adequately cover costs a working ratio of one would 
have to be recorded for each year.  The current situation in the Wastewater 
Department, with working ratios ranging from 1.8 to 5.14, is one of radical and 
increasing departure from cost recovery and one towards financial instability. 
 
A graph presenting annual deficits and working ratios for the Wastewater 
Department is shown in Figure 3.8.  
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Figure 3.8  Total annual operating expenses, operating revenues, and annual deficits, in 
Rand, for the Wastewater Department of EWS, between 1994/95 and 2002/03. 
 
 
Figure 3.8 clearly indicates that, for the Wastewater Department, total operating 
revenues have fallen short of expenses in every year for which records exist.  
Furthermore, the gap between the two has grown larger in each year between 
1994/95 and 2002/03.  The scale of this growing gap is reflected in the increasing 
deficits recorded for each year.  
 
In themselves, the working ratios for the department show an increasing failure to 
recover costs, especially over the past 5 years.  The notable exception to the history 
of declining cost recovery is in 1997/98, when a large one year boost in revenues 
brought the working ratio below two.  Figure 3.9 shows a graph of annual working 
ratios for the Wastewater Department. The weighted average working ratios for 
subsets of African and American providers are indicated.  
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Figure 3.9  Annual working ratios for the Wastewater Department of EWS, over the period 
1994/95 to 2002/03.  Benchmark values for African and American service providers are 
indicated. 
 
 
 
As mentioned, the working ratios reported in Figure 3.9 show that the Wastewater 
Department has had declining success in cost recovery with each passing year 
between 1994/95 and 2002/03, with the exception of 1997/98 when a solitary 
increase was registered.  In comparative terms, the working ratios for the 
department are extremely poor in comparison with weighted average working ratios 
for both African and American service providers.  The best performing year for the 
Wastewater Department, with respect to cost recovery, still failed to register a 
working ratio near average African values.   
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Capital expenditures in the water and sanitation sector are often funded through 
central government transfers and are typically not considered in the calculus of cost 
recovery as practiced by local governments.  However, capital costs are important to 
consider in any analysis of costs recovery efforts, since they may displace revenues, 
especially subsidies, away from other spending and influence overall cash flows.  
Figure 3.10 provides a summary of capital expenditures made by the Water 
Department of EWS on both plant and equipment and assets for all years between 
1994/95 and 2002/0313.  In the case of EWS, as with most service providers, the 
budget for capital costs is separate from that for operation and maintenance and the 
expenses associated with capital investment are recorded outside those for recurrent 
costs. 
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Figure 3.10  Annual capital expenditure of the EWS Water Department on plant and 
equipment and assets, between 1994/95 and 2002/03 (Rand). 
 
 
                                                        
13 Complete data on funds directed by EWS towards capital expenditure, for all years between 
1994/95 and 2002/03, are provided in Appendix VI. 
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Figure 3.10 indicates that there has been an increase in overall capital expenditure 
by the Water Department over the years 1994/95 to 2002/03.  Most of this increase, 
however, is accounted for in the rise in spending on assets, and not on plant and 
equipment.  Notably, there is a strong spike in capital spending in years 1996/97 and 
1997/98, when values peak at almost twice the current levels.  The peak in capital 
spending in 1997/98 coincides with the institution of the free basic water policy in 
South Africa.  Beyond this, the levels of capital expenditure decline to reflect changes 
in subsidies to the agency.  The decline in capital investment parallels the pattern of 
declining central-to-local transfers that has characterized South African public 
finances of the late 1990s (Fiscal and Financial Commission, 1997; Unicity 
Commission, 2000). 
 
 
3.3.2 Wastewater Department 
 
The pattern of capital expenditure in the Wastewater Department parallels that 
observed for operating expenditures in the department, with constant fluctuations in 
spending rather than annual increase.  Figure 3.11 provides a summary of capital 
expenditures made by the Wastewater Department of EWS on both plant and 
equipment and assets for all years between 1994/95 and 2002/0314. 
                                                        
14 Complete data on funds directed by the Wastewater Department towards capital 
expenditure, for all years between 1994/95 and 2002/03, are provided in Appendix VI. 
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Figure 3.11  Annual capital expenditure of the EWS Wastewater Department on plant and 
equipment and assets, between 1994/95 and 2002/03 (in Rand). 
 
 
Figure 3.11 indicates that spending rose between 1994/95 and 1996/97, fell sharply 
by twenty million Rand in 1997/98, and rose again in 1999/00 and 2000/01 before a 
precipitous decline back to 1994/95 levels in 2001/02.  Capital expenditure in the 
Wastewater Department has followed a significantly different course than is observed 
in the Water Department.  Furthermore, it appears that overall increases in 
spending, again, are largely accounted for by changes in spending on assets, as 
opposed to plants and equipment.  Since annual subsidy values are unavailable for 
the Wastewater Department, it is difficult to know how changes in subsidies to the 
Water Department have affected capital expenditure.  What is clear, though, is that 
capital expenditure for sanitation follows the same sporadic pattern as other financial 
flows for the department.   
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3.4 Water Service Provision – Tariffs and Cost of Supply 
 
In order to calculate annual average tariffs and costs of supply for water in Durban, 
it is first necessary to know how the volume of water sold has fluctuated on a yearly 
basis.  From these values, it will also be possible to determine if the increases in 
revenue from “general water sales” are due to increases in the amount of water sold, 
the price of water sold, or a combination of the two.  The total volume of water sold 
in each year since 1994/95 is given in Table 3.4 and is graphically represented in 
Figure 3.12.    
Figure 3.12  Total volume of water sold (kL) per year, between 1994/95 and 2002/03, by 
EWS. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.12 indicates that there was substantial variation in the volume of water sold 
by EWS between 1994/95 and 1999/00.  Between 1999/00 and 2002/03, however, 
volumes sold have been relatively constant at between 180 million kL and 205 
million kL.  These data also reveal that the rising annual revenues from water sales, 
recorded for the Water Department, are in turn primarily driven by increases in 
tariffs and not, increases in the volume of water sold.  This deduction can be made 
because revenues from water sales continued to rise sharply between 1999/00 and 
0
50,000,000
100,000,000
150,000,000
200,000,000
250,000,000
1994 /
1995
1995 /
1996
1996 /
1997
1997 /
1998
1998 /
1999
1999 /
2000
2000 /
2001
2001 /
2002
2002 /
2003
Year
Vo
lu
m
e 
(k
L)
 64
2002/03, while the volume of water sold remained relatively constant over this 
period.  Thus, tariff increases are contributing heavily to the increases in operating 
revenue observed for the Water Department and is the source revenue most 
responsible for allowing EWS to match continually rising annual operating expenses. 
 
The average cost of supply and average tariffs for water supply in Durban are critical 
variables for evaluating exactly what level of cost recovery has been achieved by 
EWS over the period 1994/95 to 2002/03.  These values are also vitally important in 
that they allow comparison with benchmark values from other providers.   
 
The average inflation-adjusted cost of supply for water provision, calculated as total 
annual operational expenses (excluding depreciation, interest, and debt service) 
divided by total annual volume sold, is given in Table 3.3.  The average inflation-
adjusted water tariff, calculated in Rand/kL, is also reported in Table 3.3.   
 
 
Table 3.3  Total volume of water sold (kL) annually, between 1994/95 and 2002/03. 
Year Volume of Water Sold (kL) Average Cost of Supply  
(Rand / kL) 
Average Tariff   
(Rand/kL) 
1994 / 1995 181 500 000 1.85 1.66 
1995 / 1996 116 900 000 3.57 3.36 
1996 / 1997 158 200 000 4.28 3.33 
1997 / 1998 170 900 000 4.17 3.51 
1998 / 1999 187 238 384 4.03 3.91 
1999 / 2000 208 100 347 3.72 3.61 
2000 / 2001 183 570 083 4.49 4.12 
2001 / 2002 182 358 251 5.21 5.03 
2002 / 2003 181 944 863 4.77 5.10 
 
 
The average tariff15, as shown in Table 3.3, increased from 1.66 Rand/kL to 5.10 
Rand/kL over the years 1994/95 to 2002/03, with the largest increase taking place 
between 1994/95 and 1995/96.  The relationship between average cost of supply 
and average tariff for water provision in Durban is examined in greater detail in 
Figure 3.13. 
                                                        
15 The complete Water Department tariff schedule for all classes of consumption, both 
domestic and non-domestic, as imposed between 1995 and 2002, is given in Appendix VI. 
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Figure 3.13  Average cost of supply (Rand/kL) and average tariff (Rand/kL) for water 
provision in Durban, between 1994/95 and 2002/03.    
 
 
As shown in Figure 3.13, average cost of supply and the average tariff for water 
follow each other quite closely as they increase between 1994/95 and 2002/03.  
There are three points of notable departure, however, from this relatively 
synchronous movement.  The first is between 1995/96 and 1998/99, when the 
average tariff fell substantially below the average cost of supply.  The second is in 
2000/01, when average tariff again fall markedly below cost of supply.  The third 
occurs in 2002/03, when the average tariff rises above the average cost of supply for 
the first time in the provider’s history.   
 
Cost recovery efforts can be evaluated by the numeric proximity of average tariff 
values to average cost of supply.  The trend over the past nine years indicates that 
EWS has continuously priced below average cost of supply.  Although average tariff 
has come close to average cost in several years, it is only predicted to exceed 
average cost for the first time in 2002/03.  This is likely a strong causal factor 
underlying the poor working ratios and annual deficits recorded in some years.  For 
instance, the largest deficits in the history of EWS occur during the same period in 
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which the largest gap is observed between average cost of supply and average tariff 
in Figure 3.13.  The trend of underpricing water, however, appears to reverse in 
2002/03.  Should the predictions of EWS hold, average tariff will rise above average 
cost of supply for the first time.  This event is predicted to coincide with the first 
non-deficit year after a sequence of record annual losses. 
                  
It is particularly instructive to compare the tariffs charged by EWS with those 
charged by other providers, particularly with benchmark values for African and 
American water and sanitation providers.  In 2003 values, the weighted average 
tariff for eight African providers is 4.05 Rand per kL, while the weighted average 
tariff for 89 American private providers is 9.05 Rand per kL (World Bank, 2000).  By 
comparison the 2003 tariff charged by EWS, the highest in the past nine years, is 
5.10 Rand per kL.  This indicates that EWS is charging higher average tariffs than 
other African providers.  It is important to note, however, that the eight African 
providers used to calculate this comparative value are among the better performing 
of Africa’s estimated 150 water and sanitation service providers.  Durban tariffs then 
rank among the highest in Africa.  The comparison also reveals that the tariff 
charged in 2002/03 by EWS is considerably lower than those charged by a cross-
section of American providers.   
 
 
3.5 Water Service Provision - Indicators of Financial and Operational 
Performance 
 
 
The cash flows and tariffs that have been described in the proceeding sections of this 
chapter are central to understanding the extent to which EWS has recovered costs.  
To gain a more complete picture of the financial performance of the Water 
Department, and of its success in recovering costs, it is also important to examine 
several other key variables pertaining more broadly to the financial and operational 
performance of EWS.  This section examines measures of financial and operational 
performance: staffing, debt service ratio, and investment.  These values are reported 
and are compared with international benchmark values in the following sections16.   
 
 
                                                        
16 The full set of annual data used to calculate values for these indicators of financial and 
operational performance are found in Appendix VIII. 
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3.5.1  Staffing 
 
The number of staff per connection is generally considered to be a strong indicator in 
service efficiency in the water and sanitation sector.   As of March 31, 2003, there 
were 2,275 total staff working for EWS.  These staff members can be categorized 
into three groups: 1) Water operations staff, 2) Sewerage operations staff, and 3) 
Finance and human resources staff.  Table 3.5 presents the total number of staff for 
each of these categories and expresses these numbers per thousand water 
connections. 
 
Table 3.4  Total number of staff and ratio of staff to water and sewer connections. 
Variable Value 
Total 2,275 
Per ‘000 Water Connections 6.46 All Staff 
Per ‘000 Sewer Connections 6.98 
Total 1,168 
Per ‘000 Water Connections 3.32 Staff in Water 
Operations 
Per ‘000 Sewer Connections 3.58 
Total 975 
Per ‘000 Water Connections 2.77 Staff in Sewerage 
Operations 
Per ‘000 Sewer Connections 2.99 
Total 132 
Per ‘000 Water Connections 0.38 Staff in Finance and 
HR Operations 
Per ‘000 Sewer Connections 0.41 
 
 
Table 3.4 indicates that number of staff is greatest in EWS’ Water Department.  To 
gain a better understanding of how the number of staff in this department compares 
with those of other providers, it can be compared to key benchmark values.  The 
average weighted number of staff for eight service providers in Africa is 8.02 workers 
per 1000 connections.  For a cross section of 89 privately-owned suppliers in the 
United States, the average number of staff per 1000 connections is 2.03.  
Comparison of these numbers with those for Durban shows that EWS has a higher 
staffing efficiency than the average utility from a cross section of eight relatively high 
performing African water and sanitation service providers.  EWS appears, however, 
to be far less efficient in terms of staffing than the average provider from a selection 
of American water and sanitation service providers.  
 
3.5.2  Debt Service Ratio 
 
The debt service ratio of the water and sanitation provider is an indicator of the fixed 
hurdle of debt repayments that the agency faces as a proportion of utility revenue.  
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The debt service ratio is calculated by taking the total annual debt service as a 
percentage of total annual operating revenues.   
 
The debt service ratio for each year between 1994/95 and 2002/03 is given in Table 
3.5.   The data reveal that, over this period, the debt service ratio has increased 
almost four-fold, with the highest values reached in 2000/01.  The levels of debt 
service reached by 2002/03 are worrying for EWS since they are equal to nearly fifty 
percent of annual operating income.   
 
In comparison to benchmark values for debt service ratio (Table 3.6), EWS falls 
between benchmark values for African and American providers.  However, EWS has 
moved increasingly toward the African value over each of the last nine years.  This 
may reflect declining levels of subsidization for the agency from central government.  
Under the GEAR program levels of subsidization have declined sharply since the early 
1990s (Fiscal and Financial Commission, 1997).    
 
 
3.5.3  Investment 
 
Total annual investments expressed as a percentage of total annual operating 
revenues are presented in Table 3.5.  As a percentage of operating revenues, 
investment has decreased substantially since 1994/95, from 15.1% to 4.0% in 
2001/02.  This may, however, be attributable to the large increase in operating 
revenues that occurred over this same period, and may not necessarily be indicative 
of decreasing investments alone. 
 
In comparison with benchmark values from a cross section of 89 American providers, 
EWS’ performance has declined significantly over the past nine years.  The 
benchmark value of 31% is twice the highest investment rate of EWS.  It is critical to 
note that the EWS’ highest rate of investment occurred in 1994/95 and has declined 
annually over the following eight years. 
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Table 3.5  Debt service ratio per year, between 1994 and 2003. 
Year Debt Service 
Ratio (%) 
Investments as % of 
Operating Revenues (%) 
94/95 13.5 15.1 
95/96 20.2 12.6 
96/97 23.4 8.3 
97/98 46.7 7.1 
98/99 32.1 6.6 
99/00 37.0 5.9 
00/01 58.6 5.0 
01/02 49.9 4.0 
02/03 - - 
   
Benchmark Values 
American 15.48 31.06 
African 121.88 N/A 
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3.6 Conclusion 
 
 
It is clear from the data presented in this chapter that EWS has had mixed success in 
its efforts to recover costs over the past nine years.   One clear conclusion from the 
data in this chapter is that the Water Department has had considerably more success 
in achieving cost recovery than the Wastewater Department.   
 
For the Water Department, annual operating revenues have come close to covering 
operating expenses in six of the last eight years.  For the past two years, however, 
expenses have exceeded revenues by a considerable margin.  In 2002/03, this trend 
is predicted to reverse itself, for the Water Department at least.  In this year, the 
Water Department is predicted to balance expenses and revenues and achieve a 
working ratio of one.  It will do this while taking in the lowest levels of subsidization 
for operating expenses recorded in recent years.  In that the Water Department is 
moving toward the cost recovery goals it has set for itself, then, this is a victory for 
EWS. 
 
In comparative terms, the Water Department of EWS ranks slightly below average 
African, but well below average American, benchmark values for cost recovery.  
However, it must be said that the African values used are based on a high 
performing cohort of suppliers and the American values are for private suppliers.  In 
terms of operating and financial performance, the EWS Water Department ranks 
above benchmarks for average African suppliers but well below the values for 
American suppliers.  
 
But the story of cost recovery is not so simple.  In direct contrast to the situation 
predicted for the Water Department, the year 2002/03 will not be a banner financial 
year for the Wastewater Department of EWS.  Instead, operating expenses will 
exceed revenues for the department by an even greater margin than in any of the 
previous eight years.  The Wastewater Department, unlike the Water Department, is 
not moving towards greater cost recovery, but is instead encountering increasingly 
large annual operating deficits.   
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“There is nothing softer and weaker than water, 
And yet there is nothing better for attacking hard and strong things. 
For this reason there is no substitute for it.” 
 
Lao Tzu “Tao-te Ching” Ch. 78 
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- CHAPTER FOUR - 
Meeting the Water Supply and Sanitation Needs of Durban’s Poor 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents a summary of efforts to meet the water and sanitation needs 
of the poor in Durban, South Africa.  The chapter addresses overall service quality 
improvements brought about by eThekwini Water Services (EWS), as well as aspects 
of service delivery that have particular bearing on low-income households.  The 
chapter also provides an overview of data on service and coverage levels and gives a 
summary of the economy of water and sanitation services from the perspective of 
the household.  To allow comparisons among population and consumer groups, data 
on a number of key socio-economic and demographic variables - including income, 
race, employment status, and housing type - are also presented and investigated for 
relationships with levels of service delivery. 
 
Among the most important aspects of service delivery to be examined is the free 
basic water policy instituted in Durban.  This policy provides 6 kL of water free per 
month to all households in the eThekwini Metropolitan Area (EMA) as part of an 
increasing block tariff structure.  Also known as the “lifeline volume” or the “free 
basic water policy”, the practice of providing 6 kL of water free per month, or 200 L 
free per day, to all households is widely considered to be among the most novel 
approaches to pro-poor service delivery currently being applied in the developing 
world.   
 
In order to understand better the impact of the pro-poor strategies adopted by EWS, 
as much data as possible were collected over a time series that captures both pre- 
and post-reform periods17.  The most well documented pro-poor reform, provision of 
6 kL of water free to all households, was instituted in 1998.  The time series over 
which most data was gathered covers fiscal years 1994/95 to 2002/0318.  This 
corresponds to the full period that EWS, and its predecessor, Durban Metro Water 
Services (DMWS), have been in operation.   
                                                        
17 Unless otherwise cited, all of the data compiled in this chapter was provided in raw form by 
Mr. Neil Macleod, Executive Director of EWS, from agency records. 
 
18 All prices referenced in this chapter are adjusted to 2003 values, at an average annual 
inflation rate of 7.32%.  This value was calculated using annual figures compiled from the 
quarterly reports of the South African Reserve Bank, Department of Finance Budget Review 
(South Africa, 1994-2002).  For complete data on annual inflation rates and on the calculation 
of the average value used here, please refer to Appendix II. 
 75
 
The specific questions that the data presented in this chapter are intended to address 
include (a) Does the free basic water policy sufficiently address service affordability 
challenges for poor households? (b) Are there other aspects of EWS’ service delivery 
system that either facilitate or discourage poor households from obtaining improved 
water and sanitation service? (c) How are the benefits of EWS’ reforms distributed?  
 
The analysis undertaken in this chapter suggests that there are two strands that 
dominate the story of service delivery to the poor in Durban.  On the one hand, 
coverage levels have increased since 1994 and the fall of Apartheid.  These increases 
are likely due to the reforms of EWS and, in themselves, are a positive outcome of 
the technical and policy innovations pioneered by the agency.  At the same time, 
there is a more ominous strand to the story of how Durban serves the poor.  This is 
a story that, in contrast, focuses on service disconnections and rising tariffs.  While 
many households have gained service, many have also seen the levels of service 
that they once enjoyed decline.  Many households are now limited to the 6kL lifeline 
by a combination of increasing tariffs for higher levels of consumption and the 
imposition of a highly aggressive disconnection policy.  This rising wave of 
disconnections tempers the positive story that emerges when only the number of 
water and sanitation connections is considered as an indicator of service delivery to 
the poor. 
 
This chapter follows the following basic structure:  It first provides an overview of 
water and sanitation coverage levels in Durban.  It then identifies the major 
deficiencies in water and sanitation coverage in the city, with a focus on describing 
those groups that face a particular need for improved access to services.  The 
chapter then presents a summary of the programs and policies that are employed in 
Durban to meet the water and sanitation needs of the poor.  The chapter concludes 
with a presentation of data on the economics of water and sanitation services, from 
the perspective of affordability to poor households.       
 
 
4.2 Identifying Groups in Particular Need 
 
When service providers speak of “serving the poor”, they often use the term “poor” 
to refer to a wide variety of groups, including the underserved and unserved.  This 
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section seeks to identify who the “poor” are in Durban and highlight which segments 
of the population have the greatest need for improved delivery of water and 
sanitation services. The section presents a summary of key socio-economic variables 
associated with the population of the EMA and the consumer base of EWS.  These 
variables are primarily drawn from the most recent census available, which took 
place in 1996, and from various reports of the eThekwini Municipality and its 
predecessor, the Durban Metro Unicity19.  The major variables addressed are race, 
poverty, average household size and income, settlement type, employment status, 
and access to water and sanitation services. 
 
As the section highlights, there are many ways of defining who is “poor” in Durban.  
In Durban, race and geography are intimately connected with both financial poverty, 
as measured by annual or monthly income, and poverty in service delivery, as 
measured by the standard of water and sanitation services received by residents.  
Furthermore, monetary measures of poverty are extremely hard to determine in 
Durban, where there are levels of unemployment as high as 31% and a burgeoning 
informal economy flourishes (Hindson and Ngqulunga, 2000).  The combination of 
these factors means that is often more practical to speak of the “poor” in terms of 
the groups that are most closely associated with either financial poverty or poverty 
in service delivery.  As the following investigation reveals, Blacks, and particularly 
Blacks living in informal areas, are the poorest group in Durban in financial terms, 
and are also by far the most poorly served group in the city.  
 
 
4.2.1 Race, Poverty, and Access to Water and Sanitation Services 
 
It is clear that Apartheid-era policies continue to have an affect on the distribution of 
public services in Durban.  Despite the collapse of Apartheid in the early 1990s, 
Durban remains a segregated and divided city.  This divide can be seen as one that 
separates the various races and income groups of the city as well as one that divides 
formal and informal regions of the metropolitan area.   
                                                        
19 The most recent census data available for Durban are from the 1996 national census.  As a 
result, much of the non-time series data relates to the pre-2001 Durban Metropolitan Area 
(DMA), as opposed to the more recently formed eThekwini Metropolitan Area (EMA).  
However, since the formation of the EMA only involved a population increase of 9%, in 
comparison with an area increase of 68%, the DMA statistics on population should stand as 
reasonable proxies for yet to be measured EMA values (eThekwini Municipality, 2002).  
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The population of Durban is broadly categorized according to four racial groupings – 
Blacks, Coloreds, Indians or Asians, and Whites (Figure 4.1).  As indicated in Figure 
4.1, the greatest proportion of the city’s residents is Black, with substantial Indian 
and White minorities.  As a legacy of the Apartheid era, these groups continue to 
differ in terms of most economic and social indicators and in terms of the 
geographical locations in the city where they predominate.     
 
The four “racial” categorizations used in Durban are the product of somewhat 
arbitrary Apartheid classifications.  “Whites” denotes those of indigenous European 
background.  “Blacks” denotes those of indigenous African background. “Asians” 
denotes those of indigenous Asian background.  The category of Asians generally 
refers to people primarily of Muslim and Hindu background descended from laborers 
from India and the East Indies, though it is also applied to some descendants of 
Chinese indentured laborers.  In Durban, “Indian” is used in place of “Asian” since 
Indians make up the majority of this category and form the second largest racial 
group in the city.  “Coloreds” denotes those of mixed race. 
 
It is estimated that 23% of Durban’s population suffers from extreme poverty, 
measured as per capita earning less than R30020 per month, and that 44% suffer 
from poverty, measured as earning less than R410 per month per person (eThekwini 
Municipality, 2002).  It is clear also that, in Durban, poverty and race are inter-
related. Poverty in the EMA is concentrated in the Black population, with 67% 
classified as either suffering from poverty or extreme poverty.  The figure for the 
Asian and Colored population is 20% each, and that for the White population is at 
2% (Figure 4.1). Poverty is also concentrated amongst females with more than half 
of the females within the EMA classified as being poor.    
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
20 Prices in this thesis are reported in South African Rand.  The exchange rate as of 1 May 
2003 was 1 $US = 7.295 ZAR. (www.economist.com/markets/currency/) 
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Figure 4.1  Racial composition of Durban showing percentage of each racial group living in 
poverty (earning less than 410 Rand per month) (Moller, 1999). 
 
 
Differences in poverty levels across the races also carry over into the standard at 
which people of different races receive water and sanitation services.  Data from 
Moller (1999) indicates that, in addition to the high degree of heterogeneity in 
Durban’s population, there is also considerable variation in the need for improved 
services across the races.  In a study of 4000 randomly selected households from 
Durban, Moller found significant differences in the access of different racial groups to 
both water and sanitation services (Table 4.1). 
 
 
Table 4.1  Access, in percent, to water and sanitation services by race (Moller, 1999). 
Sanitation Water Race 
Flush VIP21 Pit Other Pipe Public Tap Other 
Black 54 11 34 1 54 34 11 
Coloured 98 0 1 1 98 0 2 
Indian 96 0 3 1 99 0 1 
White 99 0 1 0 99 0 1 
 
                                                        
21 VIP refers to the “ventilation improved pit” – a modernized version of the pit latrine that has 
a ventilation pipe to eliminate odors and flies.  This is an on-site sanitation technology, i.e., it 
is not connected to a sewer line. 
 
61
3
23
67
20 20
2
44
12
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Black Colored Indian White Overall
Race
Pe
rc
en
t (
%
)
Racial Composition
Living in Poverty
(<R410 / month)
 79
 
As shown in Table 4.1, there are distinct differences in the types of water and 
sanitation services that each racial group predominantly relies upon.  For the Black 
population, approximately one-third of all households rely on pit latrines.  At the 
opposite end of the spectrum, nearly 100% of the White population has access to 
flush toilets.  With regard to water services, there is again a marked difference 
between services available to Blacks versus other population groups.  Only half of 
Black households have access to piped water, compared to virtually 100% of 
households from other races.  These data clearly indicate that the standard of water 
and sanitation services received by residents is closely associated with race, with 
Blacks receiving by far the lowest levels of service of any racial group. 
 
4.2.2 Poverty, Household Size, and Settlement Type  
 
The second major divide in the provision of water and sanitation services in Durban, 
after that between the races, is between formal and informal settlement areas 
(Moller, 1999).  The sharp differences in service delivery to formal and informal 
settlements, also a legacy of the apartheid era, are critical to understanding the 
economic and political dynamics of contemporary water and sanitation provision in 
Durban.  
 
The city’s formal settlements are characterized by their integration within local 
government development plans (Hansson, 2001).  These areas tend to be sufficiently 
mapped and well incorporated into the planning systems of government (Hoffman, 
2001).  The areas have normally been supplied with infrastructure facilities such as 
water supply, roads, and electricity.   
 
Informal settlements, on the other hand, are characterized by illegal developments 
in the form of built houses and shacks.  Typically, these settlements are the 
remnants of the Black homelands, which were established outside urban areas 
during the Apartheid era.  The settlements themselves often grew on free land 
outside the boundary of the former White city.  These areas normally suffer from an 
acute lack of infrastructure facilities and services and are generally not included in 
local government development plans.  With the formation of the eThekwini 
Municipality, the informal areas of Durban are now squarely in the planning 
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jurisdiction of local government.  But, despite having become integrated into the 
post-Apartheid city, these areas retain their informal character and remain the 
epicenters of poverty within the city.  
 
Average household size is one key variable that varies between formal and informal 
regions of the EMA.  The exact amount of variation in household size that exists 
between these two settlement types, however, is a matter of considerable debate.  
Official statistics for Durban consider that household size varies by only 0.2 
individuals (Durban Metro Housing, 1999).  But, on closer examination, even these 
figures recognize that within and across the races the size of households does vary 
between formal and informal settlements.  That is, once race is taken into account, 
household size does vary substantially between formal versus informal areas.  In 
official publications, the largest household sizes are recorded for Blacks in formal 
areas (5.2 individuals), while the smallest are recorded for Whites in informal areas 
(2.6 individuals) (Durban Metro Housing, 1999).    
 
While official statistics for the region indicate that average household sizes do not 
vary significantly across formal and informal settlements, anecdotal and field studies 
indicate that these data may be far from accurate.  For example, researcher Alex 
Loftus has indicated that, in informal areas, households regularly reach sizes of 10-
12 individuals (Loftus, 2003).  According to Loftus, the size of poor households is 
often very fluid and it is frequently very difficult for households to even assess their 
own size accurately.  For example, poor households will often record their size as 
being only the parental units and any direct children, regardless of whether other 
relatives or friends do live with them (Loftus, 2003).   
 
The gap between official and unofficial figures on household size is greatest for 
informal and poor areas and has been exacerbated by the HIV/AIDS epidemic that 
has swept through KwaZulu-Natal.  A full 41% of new mothers in Durban are HIV 
seropositive (Steinberg et. al., 2002).  Since Blacks record the lowest incomes in the 
EMA and predominate in informal settlements and are hardest hit by the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic, household sizes are expected to also be much larger for Blacks than all 
other groups.  The discrepancy between official and unofficial records of household 
size must be of major concern in any assessment of equity in service delivery.  This 
is especially true since EWS’ most prominent pro-poor policy, the extension of 6 kL 
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of water free to all households, is fundamentally premised on an estimate of eight 
individuals per household. 
 
As shown in Table 4.2, there are also distinct differences in access to water and 
sanitation services across settlement types.  Because the majority of informal 
settlement residents are Black, these results bear great similarity to those found 
between race and water and sanitation service levels.  However, the data in Table 
4.2 also highlight that race alone can not serve as an efficient indicator of service 
quality levels received.  This is because Blacks in informal areas receive substantially 
poorer standards of service than Blacks in formal areas.  In formal areas, access to 
flush toilets and piped water approaches 100% for non-Blacks.  For Blacks in formal 
areas, however, access to these levels of service is much lower, at 68%.  In informal 
areas, only around one-third of Blacks (who make up 94% of the population of the 
informal settlements) have access to flush toilets and piped water. 
 
 
Table 4.2  Access, in percent, to water and sanitation services by settlement type (Moller, 
1999). 
Sanitation Water Settlement 
Types / Race Flush VIP Pit Other Pipe Tap Other 
Informal – Black 34 13 52 1 29 54 15 
Formal – Black 68 9 22 1 70 20 8 
Formal – Other 97 0 2 1 98 0 1 
 
 
Elaborating on the data reported in Table 4.2, it is possible to use ward-level data 
from the 1996 South African census to further examine the relationship between key 
socio-economic and demographic variables of Durban’s population and the levels of 
water and sanitation service that citizens receive.  From a full data set of 120 socio-
economic and service delivery variables, identified to the ward-level for all 100 
Durban wards, a subset of 15 has particular relevance to questions of equity in water 
and sanitation service delivery22.  These variables are identified in the correlation 
matrix shown in Table 4.3.  Socio-economic and demographic variables appear on 
the top of the table and service delivery variables appear along the left-hand side.   
 
 
                                                        
22 A complete correlation matrix, showing the full range of water and sanitation service 
options and a greater selection of socio-economic variables, can be found in Appendix VIII. 
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Table 4.3  Correlation matrix relating socio-economic and demographic variables for  
Durban’s 100 wards with standards of water and sanitation service delivery.  The values 
reported in the table are the Pearson correlation coefficient, r, and significance value, p, on 
top and bottom respectively.  Significant correlations, with p < 0.015, are indicated in bold 
type. 
Service Delivery 
Black 
(%) 
White 
(%) 
Employed 
(%) 
Unemployed 
(%) 
Income 
R0<R2400 
(%) 
Formal 
Dwellings 
(%) 
Water in 
Dwelling 
-0.684 
0.000 
0.680 
0.000 
0.815 
0.000 
-0.596 
0.000 
-0.153 
0.128 
0.968 
0.000 
Water 
On-site 
0.288 
0.004 
-0.131 
0.192 
-0.176 
0.080 
0.252 
0.012 
0.035 
0.731 
-0.303 
0.002 
Public Tap 
0.706 
0.000 
-0.356
0.000 
-0.139 
0.169 
0.638 
0.000 
0.537 
0.000 
-0.512 
0.000 
Water 
Tanker 
0.273 
0.006 
-0.121 
0.231 
0.064 
0.530 
0.272 
0.006 
0.687 
0.000 
-0.180 
0.074 
Well/ 
Borehole 
0.301 
0.002 
-0.162 
0.108 
-0.343 
0.000 
0.183 
0.068 
0.319 
0.000 
-0.352 
0.000 
Water 
Services 
(%) 
Natural 
Source 
0.272 
0.006 
-0.162 
0.108 
-0.359 
0.000 
0.162 
0.108 
0.345 
0.000 
-0.326 
0.001 
Flush 
Toilet 
-0.664 
0.000 
0.662 
0.000 
0.784 
0.000 
-0.567 
0.000 
-0.198 
0.048 
0.938 
0.000 
Pit Latrine 
0.717 
0.000 
-0.358
0.000 
-0.209 
0.038 
0.617 
0.000 
0.584 
0.000 
-0.565 
0.000 
Sanitation 
Services 
(%) 
Bucket 
Latrine 
0.284 
0.005 
-0.117 
0.259 
-0.21 
0.838 
0.259 
0.011 
0.121 
0.242 
-0.233 
0.023 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the 1996 South African census. 
 
 
The statistical examination presented in Table 4.3 shows that, as is expected from 
observational and anecdotal evidence, race, income, and settlement type are all 
significantly correlated with the standard of water and sanitation services provided to 
the city’s residents.  The analysis provides further evidence that Black, poor, and 
unemployed households, and those in informal areas, receive relatively low 
standards of water and sanitation service.  These significant correlations do not, 
however, indicate that these variables necessarily have a causal relationship with 
water and sanitation service levels.  It is also important to note that the various 
socio-economic and demographic variables are themselves highly correlated.  Race, 
for example, is significantly correlated with all of the other variables of employment 
status, annual income, and dwelling-type.   
 
The analysis does, however, indicate that many of the variables associated with 
financial poverty and low standards of service delivery point to a common group.  
Blacks are not only the poorest citizens but are the most poorly served.  
Furthermore, Blacks in informal settlements are shown to be particularly poorly 
served.  It is in the informal settlements that the highest levels of poverty and the 
lowest levels of service coincide. 
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4.3 Pro-Poor Water and Sanitation Initiatives in Durban 
 
 
Durban has implemented a number of programs that aim to make water and 
sanitation services more readily available to the poor.  The best documented of these 
policies is known as the free basic water policy.  Under this scheme, all households in 
the EMA receive 6 kL of water free per month.  Under any of Durban’s various supply 
systems, consumption below this level is free from tariffs and fixed charges.  The 6 
kL volume itself is based on a daily pro rata allotment of 200 L to all households, 
which in turn is premised on certain assumptions regarding the daily water and 
sanitation needs of an average poor household.  One of the most important 
assumptions made on the part of EWS, in the designation of the daily and monthly 
volumes, is that the average household size in the EMA is eight people (Niklaas and 
Stein, 2001).  The 200 L daily volume is scheduled to provide 25 L per day per 
person to an eight person household.  
 
Durban also operates a number of other delivery schemes that strive to make water 
and sanitation services more affordable.  The city has, for example, provided 
alternative solutions for the provision of household services as an interim measure to 
the provision of full piped water connections and waterborne sanitation.  For 
instance, EWS provides three levels of water service delivery to its customers.  These 
may be described as full-, semi-, and low-pressure systems (Brocklehurst, 2001).  
Both the semi- and low-pressure systems are specifically designed with the poor in 
mind.  The full-pressure system has also been adapted to better serve the poor. 
 
The full-pressure system, which consists of metered connections to households, 
provides the highest standard of water delivery in Durban.  Although it covers the 
majority of Durban’s citizens, the full-pressure system still fails to reach a critical 
third of the population.  As indicated, this service deficit is particularly great in  
Black, poor, and informal neighborhoods, where formal water network infrastructure 
has yet to be established.   
 
That said, many poor and low-income households have gained access to the full-
pressure system.  In order to make the full-pressure system more responsive to the 
needs of these poorer users, EWS has implemented a number of technological 
innovations that aim to prevent the accumulation of large personal debts to the 
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utility.  These innovations are the flow limiter and the flow restrictor.  Both devices 
are used by EWS to effectively disconnect households while still allowing them to 
receive their 6 kL lifeline allotment of water.  Once households have exceeded the 
debt ceiling established by EWS, service is disconnected and a flow limiter is 
installed.  Households may then approach EWS to negotiate payment and 
reconnection.  Alternatively, defaulting households may request the installation of a 
flow restrictor.  The use of both devices is considered by EWS to be an inherently 
pro-poor approach to the problem of disconnections, since they allow households to 
receive their basic water allowance while still being in arrears and to better budget 
for water and other basic needs (McDonald, 2003). 
 
The flow limiter and flow restrictor are technological devices that allow households 
that are connected to the full-pressure system and are in arrears to continue 
receiving their lifeline volume of water while being effectively “disconnected”.  The 
two technologies, while operating on a similar theoretical premise, achieve their ends 
in quite different ways.  The flow limiter halts flow through the household connection 
so that only the daily allowance of 200 L (the pro-rata daily allotment of the 6 kL 
monthly volume) enters the household.  Once the 200 L allotment has entered the 
household, the water is shut off.  The flow restrictor, or “trickler”, allows the full 
allotment of 6 kL to enter the household but at a reduced flow rate.  Flow through 
the connection is effectively reduced and the monthly allotment enters slowly over 
the entire month. 
 
The semi-pressure and low-pressure systems involve the distribution of water to 
household tanks in poor neighborhoods.  These systems began operation in 1993 
and have operated with considerable success in informal and poor neighborhoods 
(Bailey, 2002).  Both systems have been refined since they were first launched and 
considerable experimentation with pricing took place in the early years of operation.  
Soon after the systems were established, for example, studies showed that it cost 
more to bill households receiving water via these systems than was returned in tariff 
revenue (Bailey, 2002).  Tariffs were modified in 1996 so that households using the 
semi-pressure system would receive 6 kL of water free per month.  This policy was 
so successful that the 6 kL free lifeline was eventually extended to all EWS 
customers.  As Durban’s first experiment with the provision of a lifeline volume of 
water, the semi-pressure system can be said to be the forerunner of the free basic 
water policy in Durban, and South Africa as a whole.   
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The semi- and low-pressure water supply systems in Durban represent two 
variations on a common theme.  The two systems differ primarily in the placement of 
household water tanks and the nature of the distribution network.  The semi-
pressure system involves placement of the household tanks on individual rooftops, 
while the low-pressure system involves burial of the tanks adjacent to homes.  In 
both cases, the tanks are filled regularly and provide a dependable source of water 
to poor homes. 
 
Critically, both the semi- and low-pressure systems can be installed at much lower 
cost than conventional full–pressure systems.  These savings are possible since the 
tanks rely on small diameter, low-pressure pipework, inexpensive valves and fittings, 
and manual labor for installation.  Both systems also have the added benefit of 
providing local employment due to the labor-intensive nature of the installation and 
operation.   
 
In the low-pressure system, water is reticulated using small diameter (< 50 mm) 
plastic piping, which is laid at shallow depths along roads in the area to be served.  
At suitable intervals a metered manifold box is installed, from which 20 households 
are connected.  The households themselves pay for a feeder pipe from the manifold 
to a 200 L tank.  They also dig the trench from the manifold to the dwelling.  The 
pipework is supplied, laid and connected by EWS.  In this way, each household in the 
system is provided with 200 L of water per day, the daily amount required to satisfy 
the 6 kL per month free basic water policy.   
 
Initially, charges for water received through the semi- and low-pressure systems 
were overseen by local bailiffs.  This method of charging, however, faced numerous 
challenges due to conflicts between citizens and bailiffs.  Since the advent of the free 
basic water policy, water supplied through the low-pressure system has been free.   
 
In the semi-pressure system, water mains are laid conventionally in the road 
reserve.   Domestic water tanks are installed at roof level in each house, and supply 
from these tanks is plumbed to fixtures within the home.  As the tanks take the peak 
load off the water reticulation system, pipes can be sized one size smaller than full 
pressure mains.  Limited-pressure supply to the tank is continuous throughout the 
day, and each household is metered.  The first 6 kL of water consumed per month is 
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not billed, but all consumption above this limit is charged.  Daily consumption at 
each dwelling is in the order of 700 liters (Brocklehurst, 2001). 
 
Implementation of the semi- and low-pressure systems has effectively reduced 
volumes of unaccounted for water (UFW) over the Durban water network.  These 
reductions are due to the reduced pressures demanded by both systems and the 
introduction of improved water demand management. The overall water consumption 
through these delivery systems is estimated to be 50% less than through 
conventional systems to communities of similar profile (Naidoo, 1999). 
 
 
 Figure 4.2  Photographs of semi- and low- pressure domestic water supply systems.   
 [Photo Credit: Bailey (2002)] 
 
 
 
A final water supply system also operates in Durban.  This system consists of a 
network of standpoints and yard taps that is primarily concentrated in informal, 
rural, and peri-urban areas.  Many of these taps were inherited by EWS from the 
provincial councils that previously administered water supply in the rural areas that 
were incorporated into the EMA.  In some cases bailiffs control these taps and, until 
the implementation of the free basic water policy, enforced water charges.  Since the 
advent of the free basic water policy in 1998, however, the network of taps is 
moving towards operating charge-free.  Some yard-taps operate on a pre-paid basis, 
where the first 6 kL of water are free and all further consumption is paid for in 
advance.  
 
 
A semi-pressure roof tank, on right,
supplies the water needs of a
household. 
Low-pressure ground tanks supply
the water needs of two adjacent
households. 
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According to EWS, the approach adopted in supplying communities with water 
services in Durban is one that focuses on providing options to consumers and 
attempts to produce local systems that match the financial resources and 
preferences of communities.  Various service delivery options are given to consumers 
and public participation ensures the acceptance of most people in communities. It is 
undeniable that EWS has adopted innovative technologies and policies to supply 
water to previously unserved households in the EMA.  According to EWS, community 
participation in the operation and maintenance of the system is a key element of the 
approach adopted. 
 
4.4 Serving the Poor – Expanding Coverage and Improving Affordability 
 
This section presents data on the economy of water and sanitation services from the 
perspective of poor households.  The data focuses primarily on issues of service 
affordability in the sector.  Knowing now, from the previous two sections, who lacks 
services and what strategies are in place to provide for them, this chapter goes on to 
assess to what extent the poor’s needs are actually being met in terms of coverage 
expansion and service affordability as a result of EWS reforms. 
 
 
4.4.1 Improved Access to Services 
 
One of the most important questions that must be asked to gauge the effectiveness 
of EWS’ pro-poor reforms, is how many and which people have actually gained 
access to service since they were initiated.   
 
The 1999 Durban Quality of Life Survey, a randomized survey of 4000 Durban 
residents from all neighborhoods in the city, showed that 7.3% of respondents 
reported improved access to water over the previous year (Table 4.5) (Moller, 1999).  
The meaning of ”improved access” in this survey was left to the interpretation of the 
respondents.  The timing of this study is critical, since it comes one year after the 
launch of the free basic water policy.  The study found that improved access over 
1998 to 1999 was mainly in piped water to dwellings, with 4.2% of respondents 
indicating improvement in this area.   
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Table 4.4  Improvements in water service in 1998 to 1999 (Moller, 1999). 
Service % of citizens indicating improvement 
Total Water 7.3% 
Piped Water 4.2% 
Public Tap 2.1% 
 
 
The increases in coverage shown in Table 4.4 indicate that the greatest growth in 
coverage over 1997/98 to 1998/99 occurred in piped connections.  In numeric terms 
the percentages shown in the table represent a total annual increase in coverage of 
219,000 individuals, with 126,000 of these gaining access to piped water.  Since 
income and piped water are closely related, and the wealthy have been shown to 
enjoy existing coverage levels near 100%, it is clear that most of the people gaining 
new access to water will be from poor households.   
 
 
4.4.2 Water Tariffs and Charges 
 
Charges and fees, together with tariffs, are an important determinant of whether 
water and sanitation services are affordable.  The charges and fees that are most 
important in the water and sanitation sector are connection charges, for hookups to 
the network, and the fixed charges that are components of the overall fee structure.   
These charges are especially important because they represent a fixed hurdle which 
poor households must pass before they can access services.  The following three 
sections look at the affordability of water and sanitation services by examining 
changes in wastewater connection fees, water tariff rates, and the cost of residential 
fixed charges for water supply. 
 
 
4.4.2.1 Water Tariffs and Affordability 
 
 
Tariffs for water consumption can be a major household expense, especially for those 
households that are poor.  For those poor residents who do get connected to water 
and sanitation services, it is generally held that no more than 5% of household 
income should be spent on water and sanitation (McPhail, 1993).  Anything above 
this limit so-called “five percent rule” is generally considered to be unaffordable.  
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In Durban, water tariffs for the full-, semi-, and low-pressure supply systems have 
all undergone extensive revision over the past six years23.  In each case, the trend 
has been towards the elimination of tariffs and charges for consumption of less than 
6kL per month, and towards increased tariffs and charges for higher levels of 
consumption.  Figures 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 show how the tariffs for different volumes of 
consumption in all three supply systems have changed since 1996.   The values 
indicated in all figures have been adjusted for inflation to 2003 values. 
 
Figure 4.3, shows the change in tariffs for water consumed under the semi-pressure 
(roof-tank) system.  As mentioned in previous sections, this system serves 
households that are primarily located in informal areas.  Figure 4.3 indicates that  
there was only one tariff for all levels of consumption under this system at the 
beginning of the study period.  The graph also shows that tariffs for consumption of 
between 0 and 6 kL per month dropped to zero in 1998 as a result of the 
implementation of the free basic water policy.  Tariffs for levels of consumption 
between 6 and 30 kL remained relatively constant over the period, before rising 
slightly in 2001 and 2002.  Tariffs for consumption of over 30 kL, however, rose 
dramatically after 1996, reaching a peak approximately three-fold greater than initial 
tariff by the end of 2002.  The tariff for consumption of over 30 kL of water per 
month rose particularly sharply after the implementation of the free basic water 
policy in 1998.   
                                                        
23 A complete schedule of these tariff changes is listed in Appendix VII.   
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Figure 4.3  Tariff revisions for semi-pressure water supply between 1996 and 2002.   
 
 
Figure 4.4 shows the change in tariffs for water consumed under the domestic, full-
pressure water supply system.  The graph indicates that the tariff for consumption of 
between 0 and 6 kL of water per month fell to zero in 1998, in accordance with the 
basic free water policy.  The tariff for consumption of between 6 and 30 kL, however, 
climbed steadily over the entire study period, approximately doubling in price by the 
end of 2002.  The tariff for consumption of more than 30 kL of water per month, like 
that observed for the semi-pressure system, rose sharply after 1998, tripling by 
2002. 
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Figure 4.4  Tariff revisions for full-pressure water supply (domestic) between 1996 and 2002. 
 
 
Figure 4.5 shows the tariffs for full pressure, non-domestic water consumption.  The 
graph clearly shows that there is a single rate for all volumes of non-domestic 
consumption.  The graph also shows that the cost of the tariff increased steadily 
between 1996 and 2002, rising by two-thirds over the six-year period.  This increase 
was the same as that recorded for domestic full-pressure consumption of between 6 
and 30 kL per month.  The increase is not as steep as that experienced for household 
consumption above 30 kL under either the semi- or full-pressure supply systems. 
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Figure 4.5  Tariff revisions for full-pressure water supply (non-domestic) between 1996 and 
2002.   
 
 
Figures 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 indicate that tariffs for consumption of all household water 
below 6 kL per month have fallen to zero since 1998.   Tariffs for consumption of 
higher volumes of water have, however, risen.  This is especially true for levels of 
household consumption above 30 kL per month.  Tariffs for all levels of non-domestic 
consumption have also risen, but less markedly than those for levels of domestic 
water consumption above 30 kL per month.  Thus, high volume domestic consumers 
are paying a premium above that charged to industrial and commercial water users.  
Providing 6 kL of free water is also clearly a subsidy.  However, by providing it to 
everyone, the rich benefit from it just as much as the poor.  In fact, the rich could be 
said to benefit more, because a higher percentage of them have piped water.   
 
A major constraint that Durban is experiencing with free basic water provision is the 
reduction in water demand that has occurred following the introduction of a rising 
block tariff.  Although the costs of free basic water are still a relatively small 
proportion of total water supply costs they are an increasing burden on the water 
services account.  The city has seen an increase from 8% in 1996 to 18% in 2001 of 
consumers who are receiving all their water free (i.e. are consuming less than 6 kL 
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per month) (DWAF, 2001).  The tariff structure adopted has meant that most of the 
cross subsidies in the system are from consumers in the highest tariff block. 
Provided consumption by households remains below 6 kL per month, current tariff 
structures will benefit in-need households (DWAF, 2001).  If, however, levels of 
consumption by poor households are higher than 6 kL, then they will end up paying a 
new premium for these higher levels of consumption.  As mentioned, predictions of 
levels of water consumption are largely based on an assumption of a household size 
of eight people.  The accuracy of these predictions is, therefore, a key to determining 
the extent to which the tariff structures adopted in Durban will effectively benefit the 
poor.   
 
 
4.4.3 Wastewater Connection Charges and Affordability  
 
In the Wastewater Department, connection fees are charged to gain access to EWS 
mains.  The most recent changes in these fees are shown, in inflation adjusted 
terms, in Figure 4.6.  As the graph shows, the cost of most wastewater connection 
fees increased after the 2002 revision of the departmental fee schedule.  Complete 
data on wastewater connection charges are presented in Appendix XI. 
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Figure 4.6  Inflation adjusted wastewater connection fees (Rand) pre- and post-2002 revision 
of charges.   
 
 
Figure 4.6 shows that connection fees for wastewater service have increased for 
three of the four main connection types.  Only for the smallest size of first foul-water 
connection did the charge remain constant.  For each of the other connection types, 
the price rose on the order of 8%. 
 
The wastewater connection charges shown in Figure 4.6 indicate that these fees are  
becoming more expensive in comparison with the monthly salaries of the poor in 
Durban.  As previously mentioned, 44% of Durban’s population earn less than 410 
Rand per month (eThekwini Municipality, 2002).  In addition, 67% of Black 
households earn less than this amount.  This places the connection charges for 
waterborne sanitation in 2002/03 at over ten-times the monthly salary of the 
majority of informal area residents and higher than the salary of a significant 
proportion of Durbanites as a whole. 
 
 
 95
4.4.4 Residential Fixed Charges and Affordability 
 
The residential fixed charge is the fixed component of the residential tariff.  As a 
constant charge per month, these fees can represent a particular burden for poor 
households.  Residential fixed charges for water supply, inflation-adjusted to 2003 
values, are shown in Figure 4.724.   
 
 
 
Figure 4.7  Residential fixed charges, inflation-adjusted to 2003 Rand values, from March 
1996 to August 2002 (In 2003 Inflation adjusted values). 
 
 
Figure 4.7 shows that, for consumption below 6 kL per month, the fixed charge has 
fallen to zero since late 1997.  Reduction of the fixed charge, together with the 
removal of tariffs for similar levels of consumption in 1998, forms Durban’s free basic 
water policy.  Again, this is the most pro-poor part of the pricing strategy, assuming 
that poor households are more likely than non-poor to use less than 6 kL.  For 
consumption above 6 kL, however, the fixed charge climbed sharply after this same 
                                                        
24 Full data on residential fixed charges in the EMA are provided in Appendix VII. 
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date, reaching a price more than five times that of 1997 in two years.  Since 1999, 
the fixed charge has remained relatively constant for consumption levels between 6 
and 12 kL per month.  At levels of consumption above 12 kL per month, the fixed 
charge has increased substantially since 2001, when a third tier of fixed charges was 
added to the fee schedule.   
 
Given that 44% of the population of Durban earn less than 410 Rand per month, the 
fixed charges for consumption of more than 6 kL of water per month are very high.  
For consumption between 6-12 kL per month, the current charge of 27 Rand is 
equivalent to over 5% of the monthly salary of the 44% of the population who live in 
poverty and 67% of Blacks alone.   For levels of consumption above 12 kL, the 
current fixed charge of 38 Rand is nearly 10% of the monthly salary of this group.   
Thus, the fixed charge for consumption of any volume of water above 6 kL exceed 
the well established “five percent rule”. 
 
 
4.4.5 Number of Households Disconnected for Non-Payment 
 
The number of households disconnected for non-payment of water bills is a strong 
indicator of the affordability of water and sanitation services as well as of the 
institutional environment in which poor and defaulting customers find themselves 
embedded.  As of 1999, Durban was said to boast a collection efficiency for water 
services above 95% (Naidoo, 1999).  While this indicates a strong ability of 
consumers to pay for the water they receive, at the same time up to 1000 
disconnections of defaulting customers were being made by EWS on each week day 
(Naidoo, 1999).  According to Loftus (2003), the rate of disconnection in Durban 
continues to hover around 4,000-5,000 disconnections per week.  This corresponds 
to a weekly disconnection rate of 1.3 to 1.4 percent of all connections in the EMA.  
 
The high number of service cut-offs in Durban is part of a wave of disconnections 
that have swept South Africa since 1994.  Following a roughly 85% decrease in 
central to local transfers in the mid-1990s, local authorities began increasingly to 
impose disconnections as a way of recouping costs through tariffs.  The estimate of 
the total number of disconnections imposed in South Africa since 1994 is 11.7 million 
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(McDonald, 2003).  These disconnections affect poor households predominantly, as 
they are the least able to pay for services and the most likely to fall into arrears. 
 
 
4.4.6  Interest Collected on Overdue Debts 
 
The amount of interest collected annually by EWS on overdue customer debts is a 
good indication of the degree to which poor households face increasing financial 
burdens in paying for water and sanitation services.  As Figure 4.8 shows, the 
amount of interest collected on overdue debts for water services has increased 
almost exponentially since 1994/95.  While values appear to level off somewhat in 
2000/01, the increase is particularly great between 1996/97 and 1999/2000, after 
the institution of the free basic water policy.  This interest collected by EWS 
represents a significant, and increasingly large, component of the agency’s general 
revenues. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8  Interest from overdue accounts collected annually by EWS, 1994/95 to 2002/03 
(Rand).   
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The fact that EWS has collected increasing amounts of interest on overdue debts 
since the fall of Apartheid, and particularly since the institution of the free basic 
water policy in 1998, is an indication of two scenarios that may be affecting poor   
households.  The first is that the level of household debt for water and sanitation 
services has increased, while the collection efficiency of EWS has remained relatively 
constant over the period.  The second is that household debts have not increased, 
but EWS’ efficiency in collecting interest on overdue debts has improved 
substantially.  In either case, it is clear that an increased financial burden is placed 
on consumers as a result.  It is also clear that this burden will fall particularly heavily 
on poor households, who are least able to afford such increases.   
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4.5 Conclusion 
 
The data and analyses presented in this chapter indicate that the story of how the 
poor are served in Durban with respect to water and sanitation services is highly 
complex.  On the one hand, considerable gains in coverage have been made due to 
the intervention of EWS.  As well, EWS has sought to employ a host of innovative 
policies and technologies to ensure that systems for water and sanitation provision 
respond better to the needs of the poor.  In this sense, EWS and Durban are very 
much at the forefront of work to serve the poor. 
 
At the same time, however, there is a more contentious aspect to the application of 
pro-poor water and sanitation policies in Durban.  There are major concerns over the 
actual equity inherent to EWS’ approach to serving the poor.  Advocates of the poor 
argue, and the data presented here confirm, that costs for large, poor households 
are particularly likely to have had their access to water and sanitation services 
decline in the post-reform era.  There are concerns that the free basic water policy 
has limited many households to low levels of water consumption through a 
combination of sharply increasing block tariffs for higher levels of consumption.  As 
well, EWS’ highly aggressive disconnection policy tempers the successes that have 
been achieved in terms of sheer numbers of increased connections.  With 1.3 to 1.4 
percent of all connections being cut-off per week, it is difficult to reconcile the 
disconnection practices of EWS with its other pro-poor efforts. 
 
Ultimately, it is very difficult to assess the overall success that EWS has had in 
serving the poor’s water and sanitation needs in Durban.  The policies that the 
agency has adopted clearly have increased coverage levels.  But these gains have 
just as clearly come at a great price for the poor. 
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“Whiskey is for drinking … it’s water that’s for fighting.” 
 
Mark Twain 
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- CHAPTER FIVE – 
 
Discussion 
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5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the central question of the thesis in light of the results of the 
investigation and analysis conducted in the previous two chapters.  The first sections 
of the discussion come to a conclusion on the extent to which eThekwini Water 
Services (EWS) is covering costs and serving the poor in Durban.  The following 
section then examines the dynamic between these two goals and discusses how, and 
on what terms, any successes in cost recovery and serving the poor have been 
achieved.  The section focuses on linking the findings of the previous two chapters to 
the political and economic situation in Durban and to the institutional and policy 
environment of EWS.  Finally, the chapter discusses what lessons the Durban case 
holds for other cities and for the attainment of international water and sanitation 
targets given the conventional wisdom that it is difficult to make simultaneous 
progress towards both cost recovery and serving the poor.   
 
 
5.2 Cost Recovery 
5.2.1 Cost Recovery in Water Supply 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3, The Water Department of EWS has had a mixed history of 
covering recurrent costs over the past nine years.  Over the period 1994/95 to 
2002/03, significant operating losses were recorded in five different years.  
Nonetheless, expenses and revenues for operations and maintenance did balance in 
three years between 1994/95 and 2001/02 and are projected to be exactly equal in 
2002/03.  Should projections prove to be on track, EWS will have managed to 
achieve a zero deficit year with minimal subsidization of operating expenses in the 
current year. In an era of declining central government subsidies to local 
government in South Africa and for an agency located in a rapidly growing 
developing world city, this is in itself a victory for EWS.  Superficially, it also seems 
to vindicate studies that indicate that EWS is moving towards a financially self-
sufficient future. 
 
However, on closer examination, one sees that the story of cost recovery in Durban’s 
Water Department is much more complex than a simple balancing of operating 
revenues and expenses might indicate.  One of the greatest complexities involves 
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Durban’s definition of cost recovery.  Cost recovery in Durban refers only to recovery 
of operating expenses, not capital costs.  In practical terms, this is the limited 
definition of cost recovery that most governments in the developing world have 
adopted.  Indeed, most local governments fail even to cover operating expenses; 
meeting capital costs seems far beyond the revenue generating power of many cities 
in the developing world, if not the developed world.  However, it is also clear that, 
with declining central government transfers to local authorities in South Africa, 
providers like EWS will continually have to expand their definition of cost recovery if 
they are to maintain levels of capital investment.  As the data for EWS indicate, 
levels of capital investment in water infrastructure have fallen off considerably since 
1997/98, when subsidies were at their peak.  Given the growing need for capital 
investment in water infrastructure, EWS may find that its relative success in 
recouping operating expenses in the short term dims in comparison to the rising 
challenge of financing capital investment in the long term. 
 
The financial challenge posed by future needs for capital investment in Durban is 
expected to be particularly severe.  Since the fall of Apartheid, Durban’s population 
has grown rapidly.  Between 1996 and 2001, the city recorded an average annual 
population growth rate of 0.96 and saw a substantial increase in both the size of the 
municipal area and its number of inhabitants (Naude and Krugell, 2002).  A 
considerable amount of this growth resulted from repeated expansions of the city to 
include adjacent urban, tribal, rural, and provincial authorities.  Given the pace of 
urbanization and the scale of rural-urban migration in Durban, EWS will not only face 
large capital costs for existing infrastructure, but also for expansion of the water and 
sewerage network.  Rising environmental standards in South Africa, too, are 
expected to impose sharp costs in terms of capital investment in sewage treatment 
and waste disposal (South Africa, 1999).  Thus, EWS can be expected to face sharply 
rising capital costs in an era of declining subsidies for capital investment.  With each 
passing year, it will become more difficult for EWS to maintain its current low levels 
of capital investment and it will be of considerable interest, in years to come, to 
evaluate how the agency has chosen to balance the need for investment against 
increases in tariffs and charges to consumers. 
   
In comparison with other water and sanitation service providers, the efforts of EWS 
to recover costs for water supply rank the agency well below a cross-section of 
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private American providers, but only slightly below values for top-tier African 
utilities, as measured by benchmarks for annual working ratio.  This comparison 
places Durban close to where one would intuitively expect it to be, in terms of cost 
recovery – near the top of African providers, but still well below American private 
sector standards for cost recovery.   
 
5.2.2 Cost Recovery in Sanitation Provision 
 
The cost recovery picture for sanitation provision in Durban is harder to frame as a 
success over the period 1994/95 to 2002/03 than is the situation for the Water 
Department.  In no year during this period did operating revenues cover operating 
expenses for the Wastewater Department, much less cover a portion of sanitation 
capital costs.  In fact the Wastewater Department has taken on greater and greater 
operating losses in each year since 1994/95, moving from an annual working ratio of 
3.53 in 1994/95 to a projected working ratio of 5.14 in 2002/03.   
 
Before delivering too harsh a verdict on the scale of cost recovery for sanitation 
achieved in Durban, though, it should also be remembered that the time-series over 
which data has been collected is relatively short and follows an incredibly turbulent 
political and social period in South African history.  Therefore, one should not be too 
quick to judge the financial trajectory of the department in years to come, no matter 
how dire finances may be in the short term.  
 
Given the rapid rate of growth of Durban’s population and the large shortfalls in 
coverage that EWS must make up for, it is clear that the agency will most likely be 
faced with above average capital investment needs in the near future.  Fortunately, 
the Wastewater Department of EWS has maintained relatively high levels of capital 
investment, until 2002/03 at least, in comparison with the Water Department.  It is 
possible, therefore, that these relatively high levels of continued capital investment 
have skewed the department’s working ratios somewhat.   
 
As well, the poor cost recovery performance of the Wastewater Department comes 
as no surprise for several other important reasons.  Sanitation is fundamentally a 
less political issue than water in Durban and, as a sector, enjoys less political support 
from elected representatives and community leaders.  In addition, sanitation tends 
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to have an even larger public good dimension than water in the eyes of local 
governments and, as a result, the sector often generates less strident demands for 
cost recovery.   
 
In comparison with other providers in Africa and the United States, however, the 
efforts of EWS to recover costs for sanitation are poor.  Top-tier providers in Africa 
achieve levels of cost recovery, as measured by annual working ratio, well above 
those achieved by the Wastewater Department of EWS in any year between 1994/95 
and 2002/03.  There is really no comparison between the performance of private 
American providers and the Wastewater Department of EWS in terms of cost 
recovery.  Again, the Wastewater Department is moving further and further away 
from achieving cost recovery and is incurring greater deficits with each passing year. 
 
 
5.2.3 Cost Recovery Across EWS Operations in Durban  
 
The finances of both the water and wastewater departments of EWS need to be 
examined in concert to determine whether deficits in one department are being 
covered by gains in the other.  It is common practice that cost recovery for water 
and sanitation together is achieved through cross subsidies from water to 
wastewater departments.  In Durban, it might, for example, be possible for revenue 
balances from the Water Department to subsidize the operation of the Wastewater 
Department, ultimately leaving EWS in a position where effective cost recovery is 
achieved across the entire agency.   
 
In the case of Durban, however, annual financial losses incurred by the Wastewater 
Department are far too great to be covered by any potential gains in the Water 
Department.  In any case, the Water Department has not registered excess revenues 
in any year between 1994/95 and 2002/03.  While the Water Department of EWS 
has begun to approach cost recovery in the numbers predicted for 2002/03, it has 
not had a record of profits with which to subsidize the growing deficits of the 
Wastewater Department or contribute to significant capital expenditure.  In terms of 
both urban water and sanitation provision in Durban, cost recovery - even according 
to a limited definition that excludes capital costs - has not been achieved. 
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5.3 Serving the Poor 
5.3.1 Meeting the Water Supply Needs of Durban’s Poor 
 
The following sections address the second half of the central question of the thesis, 
which examines the extent to which EWS is able to meet the water and sanitation 
needs of the poor. 
 
In terms of water coverage, it is clear that EWS, and its predecessor Durban Metro 
Water Services (DMWS), have made progress in connecting the poor since the fall of 
Apartheid and the birth of multi-party democracy.  Since 1998 especially, with the 
institution of the free basic water policy, water coverage levels have increased in the 
city.  As shown in the 1999 Durban Quality of Life Study, 7% of respondents in a 
randomized survey of the city’s inhabitants indicated that the standard of water 
service delivery they received had improved between 1998 and 1999 (Moller, 1999).  
In this study, the meaning of “improved” was left to the interpretation of 
respondents.  So, while the exact nature of the improvements achieved over the 
year 1998-1999 is unknown, it is nonetheless clear that gains were made.  Since 
access to water and sanitation services was shown to be highly correlated with 
income, and the non-poor already enjoy high levels of service coverage, it stands to 
reason that the reforms put in place by EWS have succeeded in increasing water 
coverage primarily for the poor (McDonald, 2003).   
 
As described in Chapter 4, EWS has instituted a number of novel programs and 
policies that strive to make water both more affordable and more accessible to the 
poor.  The development of the semi- and low–pressure distribution systems, for 
instance, has undoubtedly improved levels of water connectivity for the poor, 
especially in informal and peri-urban areas.  As well, adoption of the free basic water 
policy has removed tariffs and connection fees for levels of water consumption below 
6 kL per month.  The implementation of this policy, now adopted at the national 
level, has most certainly served to increase the poor’s access to basic volumes of 
water in Durban.  By reducing the cost of basic allotments of water to households, 
and by removing water connection fees and fixed charges, consumption of less than 
6 kL of water per month has become affordable for all. 
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At the same time, however, there is a second more complex aspect to the story of 
how EWS serves the water needs of the poor in Durban.  This story emerges when, 
instead of focusing only on the numeric tally of connections in the EMA and the cost 
of low quantities of water, one examines the pro-poor strategies of EWS in their 
entirety.  When one does this, it becomes apparent that institution of the free basic 
water policy has coincided with both a rise in the cost of water, at levels of 
consumption above 6 kL per month, and a sharp increase in the number of service 
disconnections taking place in poor neighborhoods (McDonald, 2003).   
 
According to Naidoo (1999), EWS had reached cut-off levels of 1000 connections per 
day by 1999.   These numbers are corroborated by Loftus, who remarked in 2003 
that, “current disconnection rates range from 800-1000 per weekday, or around 
4000 to 5000 per week.”  In research conducted with the South African Human 
Sciences Research Council, McDonald (2002) estimated that a nationwide surge in 
service cut-offs since 1994 has seen 10 million people disconnected from South 
African water networks.  
 
The number of service disconnections being made each week by EWS is 
tremendously high, given that each must be made physically, and corresponds to 1.3 
to 1.4 percent of all connections in the eThekwini Municipal Area (EMA).  In fact, the 
sheer task of turning off so many connections seems quite daunting for a service 
provider.  But of particular concern is the fact that disconnection practices on this 
scale, particularly in poor neighborhoods, would seem to contradict the spirit, if not 
the substance, of the regulations of the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 
(DWAF) that lay down the terms of a constitutionally-derived right to water. 
 
As described, to ensure that the stipulations of the free basic water policy are upheld 
in the face of rising rates of disconnection, EWS has adopted flow-limiting 
technologies that allow households to receive their monthly allotment of 6 kL, while 
still being effectively disconnected from higher levels of consumption.  From EWS’ 
perspective, the adoption of innovative flow-limiting and flow-restricting technologies 
guarantees that the disconnection policy is not only financially prudent, but also 
eminently humane.  From the perspective of many poor households, however, 
especially those that are large, these technologies mean that it is more difficult to 
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fulfill their basic needs and that they are physically prevented from taking on extra 
debt as a means of securing water in the present.   
 
The rising number of disconnections imposed by EWS has been accompanied by 
increases in the cost of water for levels of consumption above 6 kL per month.  This 
further caps the ability of poor households to fulfill their basic needs within the 
strictures of the free basic water policy.  For households that are large, these 
increased tariffs for higher levels of consumption are expected to be especially 
punishing.  At the same time, little data exists on the actual household economy of 
basic water and sanitation needs, in Durban or elsewhere in South Africa.  Durban 
represents an excellent site for further study of how the poor cope with rising tariffs 
and budget for water consumption in the framework of a free basic water policy.  As 
the progenitor of South Africa’s lifeline volume strategy, the city provides an ideal 
location for further study of the long-term consequences that such policies impose on 
the household finances of the poor.     
 
It would appear that EWS has managed to achieve the best of both worlds - they 
have managed to keep connection numbers high while also ensuring that defaulting 
households are strictly limited to 6 kL of water consumption per month.  This leaves 
the agency able to provide free service at a lifeline level to all while also engaging in 
strong cost recovery efforts.  Whether EWS can be considered to be meeting the 
water and sanitation needs of the poor then depends very much on the way in which 
the agency’s policies are evaluated and on which indicators of success are employed 
in the analysis.  If one selects numeric gains in connectivity as the indicator of 
choice, then the gains that EWS has made in serving the poor seem strong indeed.  
If, however, one factors in the scale of disconnections and the fact that these 
disconnections are likely to affect poor households disproportionately, then the gains 
that EWS has made in serving the poor become much less clear-cut.   
 
5.3.2 Meeting the Sanitation Needs of Durban’s Poor 
 
The efforts of EWS to provide for the sanitation needs of Durban’s poor have been 
relatively limited compared to the well-publicized efforts undertaken by the Water 
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Department.  Again, this may have much to do with the fact that sanitation is seen 
as a far less politically important issue in Durban than water supply.   
 
Relative to the household incomes of the poor in Durban, connection fees associated 
with the wastewater system remain extremely high.  As noted, 44% of the 
population earns less than 410 Rand25 per month.  Yet, the connection fee for a basic 
household wastewater connection is ten times this amount.  As well, charges for 
connection to the wastewater system have risen since the mid-1990s in inflation-
adjusted terms.   Connections are therefore not only expensive, but have become 
more expensive in recent years. 
 
The sanitation needs of the poor, especially those in informal areas, are primarily 
served through the extension of ventilated improved pit (VIP) toilets to poor 
households.  These on-site facilities, while an alternative to full waterborne 
sewerage, are considered to be a poor second best by most Black households 
(McDonald, 2003).  Anecdotal and statistical evidence suggests that the expansion of 
piped sewerage is not seen as important as the provision of high quality water supply 
options.  As evidence of this, an estimated 68,000 households that are well served 
with regard to water supply remain chronically underserved with regard to sanitation 
services (eThekwini Municipality, 2002). 
 
 
5.4 The dynamic relationship between cost recovery and serving the poor 
 
As mentioned, a number of critical challenges have been raised concerning the 
realized versus theoretical equity inherent in the pro-poor approaches to water and 
sanitation delivery adopted by EWS.  Critically, these challenges raise important 
questions concerning the relationship between Durban’s strategies to recover costs 
and serve the poor. 
 
The first of these challenges centers on the technologies used by EWS to limit 
consumption in defaulting households.  Many advocates for the poor claim that the 
technologies used by EWS to limit flow to homes are not, in fact, high-tech solutions 
to the right to water / non-payment dilemma.  Rather, these critics argue that the 
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flow limiter and the flow restrictor are actually imperfect, low-tech, solutions to this 
complex issue.   
 
For instance, many individuals claim that both the flow limiter and flow restrictor 
frequently fail to deliver the daily or monthly lifeline volume of water.  Often, for 
example, the flow restrictor, or “trickler”, limits flow to the point where only 2 kL of 
water might enter the home in a month (Naidoo, 2003).  Furthermore, the poor 
complain that they often feel too threatened to approach EWS for the removal of flow 
limiters or the installation and repair of flow restrictors, and often endure long 
periods of time with either no water or with severely reduced water flow to the 
household (Loftus, 2003).  As a result, instead of providing a financial safeguard for 
households, the flow limiter and flow restrictor all too often serve to further 
compromise the already marginal access to water enjoyed by the poorest of the 
poor. 
 
The second major challenge is centered on the issue of household size.  The free 
basic water policy is premised on household sizes of eight people and a supply of 25 
L of water free per individual per day (Niklaas and Stein, 2001).  However, 
considerable anecdotal evidence indicates that the poorest households tend to have 
much larger household sizes than eight individuals.  Often household sizes of 10-13 
are encountered in the predominantly Black informal settlements (Loftus, 2003).  
These already large households are now becoming even larger due to the HIV/AIDS 
crisis that has gripped the province of KwaZulu-Natal, and much of sub-Saharan 
Africa.  As adults die of AIDS, more and more single parent and grandparent-headed 
households are being encountered and families are increasingly forced to take in 
neighbors and near, and not so near, relatives (Steinberg et. al., 2002).  Still, many 
households do not include temporary or unrelated guests in their calculations of 
occupancy numbers (Loftus, 2003).   
 
One of the most important repercussions of under-reported household sizes and the 
growing HIV/AIDS crisis in Durban is that the average household size of the poorest 
households may be grossly underestimated.  With 41% of all new mothers in Durban 
testing seropositive for HIV, the size of households in Durban will only become larger 
over the coming years (Steinberg et. al., 2002).  The resulting underestimation of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
25 Prices in this thesis are reported in South African Rand.  The exchange rate as of 1 May 
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average household size will pose an increasingly large problem for effectively  
forecasting the needs of poor households and for devising effective pro-poor water 
and sanitation strategies in Durban and other South African cities. 
 
Any underestimation of average household size in Durban will have profound 
consequences for the equity of EWS’ water supply and sanitation policies.  The 6 kL 
free basic water policy will only be truly equitable if poor households are able to fulfill 
their needs within the 6 kL lifeline volume.  If they cannot, the sharply rising tariffs 
imposed above the 6 kL boundary will actually punish poor users.  Furthermore, even 
if households are able to use less than 6 kL of water per month, there is no 
guarantee that this will not severely compromise the health and welfare of household 
members.   
 
By mandating the 6 kL monthly limit and implementing an aggressive disconnection 
policy, EWS has effectively downloaded the cut-off process onto households 
themselves.  Knowing that tariffs have increased beyond the 6 kL per month lifeline 
volume, many households try desperately to stay within the 0-6 kL consumption 
band, even at great risk to themselves (McDonald, 2003).       
 
A third challenge to the equity of Durban’s water and sanitation policies rests on the 
willingness and ability of households to pay for services.  While EWS argues that 
poor citizens are often unwilling to pay for services, other research suggests that this 
is not the case.  In terms of ability to pay, certainly the 4000-5000 cut-offs 
(corresponding to 1.3 – 1.4 % of all connections) taking place per week in the EMA 
would suggest that many households are unable to pay for the services they receive.   
 
There is an assumption on the part of EWS that the poor are unwilling, although 
able, to pay for water (Loftus, 2003).  This assumption is built, partly, on the 
extensive willingness to pay literature (Rogerson, 1996).  If EWS’ assumptions 
regarding ability to pay are incorrect, however, they could pose severe risks to the 
health and welfare of the poor.   
 
The most frequently cited example of the type and scale of health risk associated 
with an inability of the poor to pay for levels of essential water consumption is the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
2003 was 1 $US = 7.295 ZAR. (www.economist.com/markets/currency/) 
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outbreak of cholera that swept a semi-rural region of KwaZulu-Natal in 2000.  This 
devastating outbreak is alleged by some to have begun when free taps were 
replaced with a system of pre-paid, metered taps.  Left without recourse, the poor, 
unable to pay the extra costs associated with the new taps, are thought to have 
simply drank from contaminated surface water (Moloi and Dieltiens, 2002).  The 
result was one of the most devastating cholera outbreaks in recent South African 
history.  This incident stands as a stark reminder to EWS of the potential 
consequences should their assumptions about the ability of households to pay for 
levels of water consumption above 6 kL per month prove incorrect.   
 
The question of whether the poor are willing to pay raises the related question of 
whether there is a “culture of non-payment” for water in Durban, as some EWS staff 
have contended (Loftus, 2003).  One of the major arguments put forward at the 
international level to support cost recovery efforts has been that charging for water 
teaches people that water has a value.  At the local level, EWS has maintained that, 
in Durban, there is a history and culture of nonpayment for water that has extended 
from Apartheid times, when Blacks commonly boycotted payment for public services 
(McDonald, 2003). 
 
Other research, however, contradicts the presumption that a culture of nonpayment 
continues to thrive amongst the poor in Durban.  Researchers in the city have been 
told by residents that the system of boycotts initiated by anti-Apartheid activists 
prior to 1994 was a specific tool directed at local governments of that time (Loftus, 
2003).  By refusing to pay local tariffs during the Apartheid era, it was hoped that 
they could destabilize the finances of local government, force recognition of their 
concerns, and ultimately bring an end to Apartheid (McDonald, 2003).   
 
These researchers hold that the boycott policy of the Apartheid era was not reflective 
of a culture of non-payment for water or a lack of appreciation for the value of water 
on the part of the poor.  In fact, they maintain that it rather reflects a strong 
understanding, on the part of local people, of the nature of local public finances and 
of the importance of water charges to the sustainability of public service delivery and 
of local government itself.  Furthermore, they state that these boycotts were not 
only directed at water, but were applied to all public services, and therefore cannot 
 115
be particularly reflective of any unique lack of appreciation for the economic “value” 
of water. 
 
According to both Loftus and McDonald (2003), these boycotts are now seen in 
hindsight by EWS as symptomatic of an extant culture of nonpayment for public 
services, and for water in particular.  From Loftus and McDonald’s research, 
however, it appears that these boycotts were a unique historical phenomenon that 
has now been replaced with a general willingness to pay for quality services, should 
they materialize.  Boycotts were just one of the many ingenious political tools of a 
bygone era that have little application in post-Apartheid South Africa.  Given this, 
they argue that EWS should be concerned that, if people aren’t paying currently, 
there is a distinct possibility that they genuinely can’t afford to pay.  The degree to 
which this is true will be difficult to assess, of course, without comprehensive data on 
household finances in Durban.  What the debate over Durban’s “culture of non-
payment” does make clear is that the extent to which the poor in Durban are willing 
and able to pay for improved water and sanitation services desperately needs further 
research.   
 
What little research has been done on the topic of willingness and ability to pay for 
water in Durban indicates that the poor are willing to pay, should the quality of 
service first increase.  As part of the Durban Quality of Life Survey, Moller (1999) 
found that new users of piped water (65%) were more likely than other informal 
settlement residents (56%) to hold the opinion that paying for services "is the right 
thing to do".  This implies that, should service levels increase, people generally have 
no major problem with paying for those services.  Provided the city moves first to 
improve the service delivery, consumers are generally willing to pay for the services 
they receive.   
 
In order to combat the perceived culture of nonpayment for water, EWS has 
instituted a strict disconnection policy.  One of the most shocking results of this 
policy has been the sharp increase in violence surrounding water issues in Durban, 
particularly in the informal settlements.  This violence has taken a toll on EWS in the 
form of rapidly increasing costs for security.  According to McDonald (2003), EWS 
now has 50 teams dedicated to service disconnections alone and accompanies these 
teams with armed guards or dogs as protection.  As revealed in Chapter 3, the costs 
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associated with providing these teams with protection are a large, and rapidly 
growing, expense for EWS. 
 
What motivates EWS, in the face of protests, increasing violence, and rising costs for 
security to push forward with their aggressive disconnection policy?  In other words, 
what makes cost recovery such an attractive option for EWS that they are willing to 
impose such large financial, social, and political costs on themselves and residents?  
The answer to this question is complicated and highlights the several reasons that 
cost recovery has gained prominence in Durban and will, most likely, continue to do 
so.  The answer also provides strong insights into why EWS has pushed to implement 
the free basic water policy and reveals the dynamic relationship that exists between 
the agency’s policies for increased cost recovery and serving the poor.  As it turns 
out, the motivations for pursuing both courses of action, in the manner that EWS has 
chosen, are intimately related. 
 
The first major reason underlying the push for cost recovery is macroeconomic in 
nature.  Following the fall of Apartheid, the national government launched a policy 
known as GEAR – “the Growth, Employment and Redistribution program” – in 1996 
to combat the declining macroeconomic health of the national economy and increase 
investment (Michie and Padayachee, 1998).  The GEAR program, combined with a 
shift towards an increasingly neoliberal interpretation of government intervention on 
the part of the African National Congress (ANC) leadership, created an environment 
of fiscal conservatism in national financial policies that strictly limited national to 
local transfers in the 1990s (Weeks, 1999).  Central to local transfers fell 85% in real 
terms between 1991 and 1997 and an additional 55% between 1997 and 2000 
(Financial and Fiscal Commission, 1997; McDonald, 2002).  This macroeconomic 
environment in turn imposed strong financial constraints on local governments, who 
were confronted with dwindling financial assistance from central government.  The 
fiscally conservative policy environment created by GEAR at the national level is 
central to understanding the origins of the current focus on cost recovery by local 
government in South Africa26.   
 
                                                        
26 It is worth noting that the move towards fiscally conservative budgetary and finance policies 
in South Africa, as implemented through GEAR, was pursued without the involvement and 
support of the World Bank.   
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The fiscal conservatism that arose from the macroeconomic climate in South Africa in 
the 1990s was also fed by an increasing focus on urban competitiveness at the local 
level.  Since the fall of Apartheid, cities like Durban, Johannesburg, and Cape Town 
have increasingly seen themselves as competing for private investment and 
assistance from central government.  These cities now see themselves not only as 
competing against each other for funds, but against cities of similar caliber around 
the world.  This new focus on urban competitiveness has led cities like Durban to 
increasingly look for ways to reduce the tax burden on firms, so as to attract new 
business and retain existing ones (McDonald, 2002).  Implementing cost recovery in 
public service provision is seen as one very effective way of reducing the burden of 
cross subsidization on industry to make relocation of outside firms more attractive.  
In fact, the Durban Chamber of Commerce and Industry has stated that cost 
recovery is seen as one of the most effective way to improve local tax conditions to 
attract industry and, in 2002, noted that, “the cost of water is one of the major 
components of the total infrastructural cost, over which our members have no 
control” (Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 2002). 
 
But how, given a history of boycotts against service providers, rising anger at 
disconnections, and the historically pro-poor approach of the ANC and other anti-
Apartheid parties, has EWS actually been able to maintain its cost recovery policies.  
This question necessarily brings one to examine the dynamic relationship between 
Durban’s policies to recover costs and serve the poor.  
  
Given the political climate of post-Apartheid South Africa, it would have been very 
difficult for a local government department to implement a pure cost recovery 
strategy in water and sanitation provision.  While this may have been attractive to 
bureaucrats, given the macroeconomic climate and the decline in central-local 
transfers, it would have been unlikely to pass the hurdle of being accepted by elected 
local politicians.  Despite the transition towards financial conservatism at the national 
level of the ANC, local branches of the party remained very much rooted in the 
activist traditions of the Apartheid struggle.  In the days after Apartheid, and even 
now, it would have been literally unimaginable for local elected officials to accept 
such a hard nosed and apparently anti-poor policy stance.  In fact, the reluctance of 
local politicians to the setting of cost-recovering tariffs is one of the major reasons 
that privatization is so often advocated as a tool for building the political will to allow 
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cost recovery.  In South Africa, as in other nations, politicians have preferred to 
make extravagant promises about what can be given to the poor and are generally 
reluctant to bite the electoral hand that feeds them.  
 
The wedding of Durban’s cost recovery strategy to a well-publicized campaign to 
serve the poor then should come as no surprise.  On its own, a plan for increased 
cost recovery in water and sanitation would likely have been rejected by the public 
and by publicly-elected officials alike.  As has been shown, EWS knew by 1996, from 
studying the small semi-pressure supply system, that the revenues gained from 
charging customers for levels of consumption below 6 kL per month were less than 
the cost of actually billing these consumers (Bailey, 2002).  This realization also 
happened to coincide with increasing discussion in the central government on 
whether “basic services” should be provided free to the public.  While many local 
governments were aghast at the idea of having to provide free water and other 
services, EWS realized that they already had strong indications that such a scheme 
would be not only practicable, but cost-effective.  EWS also recognized that 
instituting a policy where small volumes of water were given away to the poor would 
allow them to win over the public and elected officials and provide a way for both 
groups to buy into the idea that heightened cost recovery would be fair. 
 
The move to drop charges within the semi-pressure water supply system in 1996 
was supported by studies that showed charging for small volumes of water actually 
cost agencies more than they gained in revenue (Bailey, 2002).  This work was 
further supported by studies in Zimbabwe and elsewhere which showed a similar 
relationship between profitability and low levels of service consumption (Bond, 
1999).  By giving away low volumes of water, EWS could effectively implement a 
pro-poor policy at no net cost to itself.  EWS had already done exactly this within the 
semi-pressure distribution system as of 1996 and moved shortly thereafter to extend 
the lifeline volume to all consumers.   
 
But why should all consumers be granted the lifeline volume under the free basic 
water policy?  EWS in its pragmatism clearly knew that extending the lifeline volume 
to only the poor would meet with resistance from both wealthy households and 
industrial and commercial consumers.  Studies showed, for instance, that the 
majority of wealthy households – who consume the greatest volumes of water and 
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therefore provide the bulk of domestic tariff revenues to EWS – were not willing to 
subsidize water consumption by the poor.  To overcome this resistance, EWS had the 
insight of giving all households 6 kL of water free per month in the context of a rising 
block tariff structure, where households that used more than 6 kL would then pay 
increasing rates for consumption.  The extension of the lifeline tariff bought political 
support from wealthy residents and succeeded in making the cost recovery strategy 
devised by the agency palatable to both rich and poor alike.  
 
It has been said that the 6 kL free water policy provides EWS with the moral high 
ground that it needs to effectively implement its strict cost recovery strategy (Bailey, 
2002).  A cynic might argue that the free basic water policy is just a ruse to improve 
the effectiveness and efficiency of cost recovery efforts.  But this is not likely the 
case.  In fact, activists in the field feel that the intentions of DWAF and EWS officials 
are honorable and that they are truly committed to the expansion of water and 
sanitation coverage for the poor (McDonald, 2003).  And EWS has brought about 
both water and sanitation coverage increases for the poor in Durban.  But, critics say 
that EWS has also become divorced from the ground and often fails to see the 
negative consequences of the strict cost recovery policies they are implementing.  
Ultimately, EWS has capitalized on the cost recovery opportunities afforded by the 
carefully delimited free basic water policy, but will have to address the sharp 
penalties that they now impose on poor households, especially those that are large. 
 
 
5.5 Lessons and Conclusions 
 
Conventional wisdom in the water and sanitation sector holds that it is difficult to 
make simultaneous progress towards both cost recovery and serving the poor.  
Certainly few providers have made comprehensive in-roads in both areas, 
particularly in the developing world, and Durban is often referenced as a unique case 
where headway in both areas has been achieved.  The analysis undertaken in this 
thesis indicates that Durban has indeed made progress in serving the poor and 
covering costs.  As the thesis has also highlighted, doing so has not been easy.  
Neither have the gains in both areas been clear-cut or uncontested.  
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The Durban case highlights the dynamic trade-offs that exist between policies to 
recover costs and serve the poor.  The case also shows the difficulty involved in 
evaluating efforts to achieve cost recovery and serve the poor, when both may be 
used as guises to actually pursue the opposite.  As evidenced in Durban, what may 
appear to be a superficially pro-poor policy, such as the extension of a lifeline 
volume of 6 kL of water free to all, may in fact be a cost cutting measure on the part 
of local government.  Conversely, efforts to disconnect people from the water 
network may be presented as a strategy to reduce the debt load on poor families.  
Ultimately, the politics of both cost recovery and serving the poor are murky.  
Policies in both areas are premised on a need to win over local residents and the 
representatives they elect and it is often difficult to assess where serving the poor 
ends and recovery of costs begin.  Separating the rhetoric associated with both cost 
recovery and pro-poor policies from actual outcomes is essential if a true 
understanding of the ramifications of these policies on the poor, in particular, is to be 
gained. 
 
The applicability of the exact cost recovery and pro-poor strategies adopted by EWS 
in other cities in the developing world may be limited.  But the approach to 
combining the two ends to improve the political-acceptability of cost recovery 
strategies could be much appreciated by local governments in other cities in the 
developing world, and beyond.  The Durban case contains powerful lessons for other 
governments in how to structure cost recovery efforts in ways that not only make 
them a highly desirable and practicable means of improving urban competitiveness 
and addressing unfavorable macroeconomic conditions, but also make them more 
palatable to both politicians and members of the public.   
 
At the same time, the Durban case holds equally powerful lessons for advocates of 
serving the poor.  The complex inter-relationship between cost recovery efforts and 
seemingly pro-poor strategies make organizing against cost recovery and tariff 
increases a challenging proposition.  The Durban case should be carefully studied by 
advocates for the poor, opponents of tariff increases, and the anti-privatization lobby 
to better familiarize themselves with the changing language of service delivery and 
the complexities of the political rhetoric that now surrounds these issues. 
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Whether the gains that Durban has made can be achieved by other cities, 
particularly in Africa, is questionable.  Conditions in Durban are unique.  The city is 
one of the wealthiest on the continent.  As well, the water and sanitation 
infrastructure that does exist was in relatively sound condition and virtually the 
entire network was metered at the start of the reform period.  Furthermore the local 
government is more energetic than most and has tremendous human capital, on a 
scale that few other city governments enjoy.  This human capital has been essential 
for managing the inherent and immensely complex tensions that exist between the 
agency’s policies for improving cost recovery and serving the poor.  Keeping the two 
separate, both in application and in the minds of the public and politicians, requires a 
highly trained and talented bureaucracy that is in tune with the political winds of 
change and the practical realities of policy implementation.   
 
There are other aspects of the Durban case that may not lend themselves to 
replicability.  For example, the gains that Durban has achieved have required a 
degree of cross subsidization from the wealthy, which in many other cities in Africa 
would be unavailable on a similar scale. Many developing country cities lack the core 
of wealthy households that Durban is able to rely upon to carry the increased burden 
of extending connectivity to the poor and supplying them with the lifeline volume.  
As well, implementation of the free basic water policy, according to the Durban 
model, requires a highly professional agency that is relatively free from corruption 
and is extremely stable.  The Durban model is premised on the strict application of 
rules and on the fulfillment of basic service promises.  Should revenue collection 
from the rich decline, for instance, the system would fail to operate effectively.  
Should the poor have no hope of receiving improved services, they would pay even 
less frequently than they do for volumes of consumption above 6 kL per month.  
Should disconnections not be made, defaulters would not curb consumption above 6 
kL per month.  Thus, a relatively high degree of efficiency is central to the operation 
of the Durban model.  Without a highly efficient agency, the Durban model will be 
unlikely to succeed. 
 
The Durban case does, however, bear powerful insights into how local water and 
sanitation service providers in the developing world can better manage their complex 
role as intermediaries between national and local level political actors.  Situated 
between national and local branches of the ANC, EWS was faced with the difficult 
 122
task of implementing nationally dictated policies for cost recovery that were bound to 
be unpopular with locally elected politicians.  As shown in this thesis, the financial 
constraints imposed by increasingly restrictive national fiscal policies were among 
the most important factors driving the local push for cost recovery in Durban.  And 
yet, in order to move towards cost recovery, EWS had to negotiate local political 
hurdles often established by decentralized functionaries of the ANC.  EWS, like many 
large-city service providers, found itself at the complex intersection of national and 
local politics and was forced to devise systems that allowed it to manage the 
tensions that arose from the meeting of these very different political interest groups.   
 
The complex dynamic that EWS established between its policies for serving the poor 
and recovering costs can, to some extent, be seen as a means of coping with its 
position as an intermediary between two radically different levels of political actors. 
The way in which a locally palatable policy option, the extension of the lifeline 
volume, was paired with implementation of a less appealing (at the local level, at 
least) cost recovery scheme holds strong lessons for other local governments who 
must try to sell nationally-driven policies to locally-elected officials and their 
constituents. 
 
The Durban case also bears lessons for the fulfillment of international water and 
sanitation targets, which are increasingly premised on the achievement of both full 
cost recovery and meeting the needs of the poor.  Again, the chief lesson is that 
great creativity and innovation are needed to skirt the political hurdles that often 
prevent the application of pure cost recovery strategies.  The Durban case also 
indicates that by combining strategies for both cost recovery and service to the poor, 
there is hope that the two aims can be achieved simultaneously.   But the case also 
indicates that the headway made, as in Durban, is likely to be contested. 
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N.B.  All monetary values reported in Appendices I through XII are in raw form and 
are not adjusted for inflation.  All monetary values reported in the graphs and tables 
appearing in the body of the thesis, however, are adjusted for inflation using the 
values reported in Appendix II. 
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Acronyms 
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          Table A1.1.   List of Acronyms 
Abbreviation Definition 
DMA Durban Metropolitan Area 
DMWS Durban Metro Water Services 
DWAF Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 
EMA EThekwini Municipal Area 
EWS EThekwini Water Services 
GEAR Growth, Employment, and Redistribution Program 
kL Kilo-Liter 
R Rand 
RSA Republic of South Africa 
UFW Unaccounted For Water 
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                     Table A2.1.   Annual inflation data, 1994-2002, and Average Inflation  
                     Rate for the same period* 
Year Inflation Rate (%) 
1994 8.90 
1995 7.90 
1996 7.40 
1997 8.60 
1998 6.90 
1999 5.20 
2000 5.30 
2001 5.80 
2002 9.90 
AVERAGE VALUE 7.32 
 
* Figures taken from the quarterly reports of the South African  
Reserve Bank, Department of Finance Budget Review 
 
          Note:  In all cases where the full time series 1994/95 to 2002/03 is  
                           referenced, inflation adjustments are made using the average  
                           annual value reported above.  Because the full range of annual 
                           inflation rates is only between 5.2% and 9.9%, the use of this 
                           average allows rapid and efficient calculation with a minimum 
                           of error.  For shorter periods each individual annual rate is  
                           applied to calculate inflation-adjusted values. 
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- APPENDIX III - 
 
Water Department Revenue and Expense Profiles for  
eThekwini Water Services 
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Table A4.1.   Breakdown of the 115 “General Expense” Categories for the Water 
Department of EWS into 45 key constituent sub-categories. 
Advertising 
Alterations to Offices 
Bulk Purchases 
Capital Charges 
Chemicals 
Cleaning 
Computer Software 
Conferences 
Consultant Fees 
Consumables 
Contractors 
Electricity 
Fuel 
Furniture 
Hire of Equipment 
Insurance 
Laboratory Expenses 
Laundry 
Legal Expenses 
Licences and Permits 
Marketing 
Medical Exams 
Meter Reading Costs 
Pest Control 
Postage 
Printing 
Radio Communications 
Refuse Removal 
Rent 
Safety Equipment 
Security 
Small Plant and Tools 
Sundries 
Telephone 
Training and Seminars 
Transport 
Unemployment Insurance 
Water 
Office Accommodation 
Technical Services Costs 
Administration Costs 
Executive Costs 
Finance Department Costs 
HR Costs 
Material Management 
 
 134
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- APPENDIX V - 
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Water Department Capital Expenditure 
 
Table A6.1.  EWS Water Department capital expenditure profile, showing funds directed to 
capital spending, 1994/95-2002/03, in Rand.   
Year Assets 
(Rand) 
Plant and Equipment
(Rand) 
Total Capital Expenditure
(Rand) 
94/95 36,197,897 4,709,895 40,907,792
95/96 51,196,127 8,976,358 60,172,484
96/97 134,964,599 19,564,525 154,529,124
97/98 233,150,050 24,147,788 257,297,838
98/99 116,301,499 13,600,751 129,902,251
99/00 94,235,820 14,263,195 108,499,016
00/01 119,859,855 9,975,420 129,835,275
01/02 123,261,584 16,081,420 139,343,004
02/03 - - -
 
 
 
Wastewater Department Capital Expenditure 
 
Table A6.2.  EWS Wastewater Department capital expenditure profile, showing funds directed 
to capital spending, 1994/95-2002/03, in Rand.   
Year Assets  
(Rand) 
Plant and Equipment
(Rand) 
Total Capital Expenditure
(Rand) 
94/95 39,580,374 6,324,301 45,904,675 
95/96 55,142,126 8,745,268 63,887,394 
96/97 98,585,307 20,875,482 119,460,788 
97/98 113,144,846 13,503,487 126,648,332 
98/99 91,646,957 5,270,232 96,917,189 
99/00 103,533,171 5,327,844 108,861,015 
00/01 114,751,606 5,825,091 120,576,697 
01/02 43,450,051 1,877,208 45,327,259 
02/03 - - -
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- APPENDIX VIII - 
 
Indicators of EWS Financial and Operational and Performance 
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Table A8.1.  Annual Debt Service and Investments 
(Rand) 
Year Annual Debt 
Service 
(Rand) 
Investments 
(Rand) 
94/95 30 660 848 232 740 574
95/96 59 910 195 233 478 699
96/97 113 115 975 308 837 958
97/98 261 797 838 303 201 191
98/99 212 118 694 309 083 096
99/00 270 988 196 309 585 864
00/01 436 294 955 310 070 901
01/02 434 514 752 3 764 165
02/03 - -
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- APPENDIX IX - 
 
Water Supply and Production 
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                    Table A9.1.  Total water production (kL) by EWS per year. 
Year Total Water Production (kL) 
94/95 201,800,000 
95/96 131,500,000 
96/97 271,900,000 
97/98 284,800,000 
98/99 279,681,684 
99/00 276,607,942 
00/01 266,526,700 
01/02 261,185,036 
02/03 249,239,538 
 
 
Table A9.2.  Total Kiloliters bought by EWS, total kiloliters sold, Unaccounted for Water (kL), 
and Unaccounted for Water (%). 
Year Total Water 
Bought (kL) 
Total Water 
Sold (kL) 
UFW (kL) UFW (%) 
94/95 201,800,000 181,500,000 20,300,000 10.1 
95/96 131,500,000 116,900,000 14,600,000 11.1 
96/97 271,900,000 158,200,000 113,700,000 41.8 
97/98 284,800,000 170,900,000 113,900,000 40.0 
98/99 279,681,684 187,238,384 92,443,300 33.1 
99/00 276,607,942 208,100,347 68,507,595 24.8 
00/01 266,526,700 183,570,083 82,956,617 31.1 
01/02 261,185,036 182,358,251 78,826,785 30.2 
02/03 249,239,538 181,944,863 67,294,675 27.0 
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- APPENDIX X – 
 
Correlation Matrix of Ward-Level Socioeconomic and Demographic 
Parameters with Water and Sanitation Service Delivery Variables  
for Durban  
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Table A11.1.  Wastewater Department connection fees (Rand) (EWS, 2003). 
Type of Connection Pre-2002 Post-2002 % change
100 mm diam  R3,353.50 R3,353.50 8% For first connecting foul-water sewer 
150 mm diam R3,550.50 R3,835.00 8% 
100 mm diam  R3,704.00 R4,000.00 8% Foul water sewer ≤ 10 m in length 
150 mm diam R3,920.50 R4,235.00 8% 
Connecting foul-water sewers having diameter greater 
than 150 mm nominal diameter 
Full Cost Full Cost 0% 
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Table A12.1.  Interviews held during course of thesis research. 
Date Time  Name Position Notes 
23 April 2003 10-11 am Alex Loftus Researcher, 
Oxford University 
Telephone 
Interview 
28 April 2003 4-5 pm David McDonald Professor, 
Queen’s University 
Telephone 
Interview 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
